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LET THEM RENT CAKE: GEORGE PATAKI,
MARKET IDEOLOGY, AND THE ATTEMPT TO
DISMANTLE RENT REGULATION
IN NEW YORK
Craig Gurian*
INTRODUCTION
There are not many issues uponwhich the editorial boards of all
the daily newspapers in New York City agree. Yet in the spring of
1997, The New York Times, the Daily News, the New York Post,
and Newsday were unanimous in respect to one thing: rent regula-
tion had to go. The editorialists (joined, less surprisingly, by their
colleagues at the Wall Street Journal and Crain's New York Busi-
ness) were hardly reflecting popular sentiment. A poll of New
York City residents in June 1997 found that "[a]t least 70 percent of
[New Yorkers]-including homeowners and tenants-said rent
regulations were necessary to provide affordable housing and to
prevent rents from soaring."1
What the editorialists were reflecting was the pervasiveness of
the idea of the "free market" as natural and beneficial, and of the
corollary notion that restrictions on that free market are unnatural,
unjust, and counterproductive.2 This theology provided the basic
assumption that underlay and constricted much of the policy de-
bate over whether to extend, modify, or eliminate the rent regula-
tion system, a system which was due for its periodic renewal on
June 15, 1997.1
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J.D., Columbia Law School; M.A., Columbia Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
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1. See David Firestone, The Rent Battle: The Reaction; Rent Regulations Firmly
Supported in New York City, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1997, at Al.
2. See, e.g., Editorial, Reform Rent Laws; Don't Rush a Deal, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus.,
Apr. 14, 1997, at 8 [hereinafter Editorial, Reform Rent Laws].
3. From the outset, rent regulation had been framed as a "temporary" system,
designed only to continue so long as a housing emergency existed in New York. See,
e.g., Local Emergency Housing Rent Control Act of 1962, 1962 N.Y. LAWS ch. 21
(requiring periodic examination for presence emergency conditions after April 1,
1967). As such, the law contained a sunset provision, and an affirmative act of the
State Legislature was required to re-authorize the system. See id.
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Opponents of rent regulation, of course, had a serious problem
with which to deal. Rent regulation protected about 2.5 million
people in New York City.4 It was thus crucial for adherents of mar-
ket theology to don the garb of market populists, and they did so
with a vengeance. Fundamental questions of greed and power
were turned on their head. Forget that the principal motive for
building owners and their allies might indeed be the maximization
of profit. Forget that the security of tenure that tenants enjoyed
under rent regulation (i.e., the right to lease renewals) would evap-
orate if rent regulation were to end and that, thereafter, tenants
could remain in their homes only so long as the arrangement suited
the landlord. Focus instead on a very different picture painted by
opponents of rent regulation: the quintessential landlord was the
struggling owner of a small building being deprived of the ability to
earn a livelihood. 6 The quintessential tenant was the wealthy fam-
ily shamefully exploiting the system at the expense of their poorer
brethren.7 If only regulation were ended, rents might actually go
down, and a new era of apartment construction would begin.
At the center of the controversy was New York's governor,
George Pataki, a man firmly committed to market theology, and a
man whose reelection campaign was only a year away. The Gover-
nor, the unquestioned leader of his party,8 had an ambitious
agenda: set rent regulation on the road to its demise while present-
ing himself as a friend of tenants.9 Through a strategy of conceal-
ment, soft-pedaling, and implicit coordination with like-minded,
pro-landlord forces, he came close to staging a spectacular short-
term victory. Instead, he ultimately had to settle for making what
was still real and substantial progress' ° toward a day when no
apartments would be regulated, and market values would trump all
other values.
Indeed, the June 2003 reprise of the rent regulation debate can
only be understood in light of the outcome in 1997. In 2003, anti-
regulation forces were happy to consolidate their gains by letting
4. See N.Y. CITY RENT GUIDELINES BD., 1996 NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AND
VACANCY SURVEY [hereinafter HOUSING AND VACANCY], available at http://
www.housingnyc.com/research/hvs96/96findings.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2003).
5. See id.
6. See discussion infra Part I.E accompanying notes 102-141.
7. See discussion infra Part I.D accompanying notes 93-101.
8. See James Dao, Pataki Courts Democrats for Bond Act, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9,
1996, at B1.
9. See discussion infra Part I.H.2 accompanying notes 171-189.
10. See discussion infra Part II.A accompanying notes 321-360.
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the 1997 system continue for as long as possible; pro-regulation ad-
vocates were desperate to recapture lost ground by trying to repeal
the core of the 1997 amendments. 1' Though not well understood
by the public or press at the time, 1997 had been a watershed
moment.
This essay examines the ideological and political struggle over
rent regulation that was waged by rent regulation opponents in the
Spring of 1997. Part I traces the debate as it unfolded in 1997, in-
cluding the role of legislative leaders, the governor, the press, and
anti-regulation advocates. It focuses on the assumptions about the
market shared by the various anti-regulation protagonists, and on
the factors starkly omitted from their analyses. Part II sets forth
the results of the debate, examining the provisions and conse-
quences of the "Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1997," including
the legislation passed in 2003 to extend rent regulation another
eight years. Finally, Part III offers conclusions about the role of
market theology, the nature and motivation of anti-regulation ar-
guments, the strategies of the governor, and the future of rent
regulation.
It is important that the 1997 battle over rent regulation be under-
stood as part of a struggle that had been going on for more than
fifty years (see the Appendix for a chronology of New York City's
rent regulation systems). On the eve of the 1997 debate, there was
a residual system of strict rent regulation called "rent control" that
was still in place for approximately 70,000 apartments in New York
City.' 2 When such apartments were vacated, and if the building
had six or more units, they joined the much larger stock of "rent
stabilized" apartments, units that were governed by a looser system
of regulation. The stock of rent-regulated apartments, which to-
taled more than 1,000,000 units, 3 was the focus of the debate, and
is the focus of this paper.
The principal features of rent stabilization as it existed as the
beginning of 1997 can be summarized as follows: 1) so long as a
tenant paid the rent and did not engage in conduct violative of his
lease, that tenant was entitled at lease expiration to a written one-
or two-year renewal lease; 4 2) once an initial legal rent had been
11. See discussion infra Part I.C accompanying notes 375-396.
12. See Clifford Levy, The Rent Battle: The Tenants; City Hall Workers Flooded
With Phone Calls, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1997, § 1, at 29.
13. See Richard Pdrez-Pefia, New Era for Rents, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1996, § 1, at
270.
14. See SEPTEMBER JARRETT & MICHAEL McKEE, RENT REGULATION IN NEW
YORK CITY: A BRIEFING BOOK 48 (1993).
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set (when the apartment was first registered as being rent stabi-
lized), further rent increases (for a one-year renewal, a two-year
renewal, and, generally, a "bonus increase" after an apartment had
been vacated) were set each year by a public body, the Rent
Guidelines Board;15 3) these increases were supposed to track the
increase in costs borne by landlords in running their buildings, 6
although whether the Guidelines Board was being too generous or
too stingy was a constant source of debate between tenants and
landlords; 4) a new tenant stepped into the rent-stabilized shoes of
his predecessor; 7 5) landlords were not permitted to reduce ser-
vices (and were subject to reductions in collectible rent if they
did); 18 6) a family member of a tenant who had been living with
that tenant was entitled to a lease in her own name were the named
tenant to die ("tenant succession"); 19 7) landlords were entitled to
rent increases both for building-wide capital improvements they
made, and for improvements they made to individual apartments
(in practice, generally apartments that had been vacated);20 8)
apartments could be deregulated either if they were renting for
$2,000 or more and were then vacated, or if they were renting for
$2,000 or more and the tenants in occupancy had income in each of
two successive years of at least $250,000;21 and 9) apartments in
buildings with fewer than six units were not covered at all.22
According to the 1996 New York City Housing and Vacancy Sur-
vey, approximately 68 percent of rent stabilized apartments were
occupied by households with total 1995 household income under
$40,000;23 91.5 percent of rent stabilized apartments were occupied
by households with total 1995 household income under $80,000.24
15. See id.
16. See Rent Stabilization Law ("RSL"), N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 26-510(b)
(1969) (listing projected real estate taxes and maintenance costs as factors for the
Rent Guidelines Board to consider when setting rent increases).
17. The new tenant signs a so-called "vacancy lease." See RSL § 26-511.
18. See id. § 26-514.
19. See Rent Stabilization Code, N.Y. COMp. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 9, § 2523.5(b)
(1997).
20. See id. § 2522.4.
21. See Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1993, 1993 N.Y. LAWS, ch. 253.
22. See RSL § 26-504(a).
23. See N.Y. CITY RENT GUIDELINES BD., HOUSING NYC: RENTS, MARKETS &
TRENDS '97 app. D.2 at 102 (1997), available at http://www.housingnyc.comresearch/
pdf-reports/97book.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2003) [hereinafter MARKETS & TRENDS].
24. See id.
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I. THE 1997 DEBATE
A. A Campaign of Disinformation
The rent regulation battle began in earnest when Joseph Bruno,
the Majority Leader of the New York State Senate, announced in
December, 1996 that he was going to "end rent control as we know
it."'2 5 Bruno, asserting that rent regulation had done "as much
damage to the city's housing market as an 'atomic bomb' would,"
said he would simply let regulations expire on June 15, 1997 if the
system were not dramatically overhauled to deregulate all apart-
ments except those occupied by people with disabilities, senior citi-
zens, and people with the "lowest income," a category the Senator
did not define further.26
On one level, Senator Bruno's position did not appear to be idle
boasting. Both houses of New York's legislature operated largely
by one-person rule: the Democratic-majority Assembly by its
Speaker, Sheldon Silver; the Republican-majority Senate by its
Majority Leader, Mr. Bruno. 27 The Republicans in the State Sen-
ate held a five-vote majority in that chamber,28 and it was true that
legislative inaction would effectively kill rent regulation. 29 On an-
other level, however, politicians and the press understood that rent
regulation continued to have widespread support, and that Senator
Bruno's statement represented merely an opening gambit in what
would be a difficult negotiation.3 °
The Governor's strategy was to maintain a low profile, allowing
Senator Bruno to take political flack for urging the end of rent
regulation, and then belatedly come forward with a plan to end
rent regulation more gradually. The Governor would then charac-
terize himself as having offered a "compromise" that protected te-
25. See Editorial, Rent Control and Reason, TIMES UNION (Albany), Jan. 6, 1997,
at A6.
26. See Joel Stashenko, Bruno Softens Stance on Rent, TIMES UNION (Albany),
Dec. 31, 1996, at B2; see also Pataki Urges Gradual End of Rent Laws, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 1996, at B1.
27. See, e.g., James C. McKinley Jr., Before Bills Move in Albany, 3 Leaders Cut
Deals in, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2002, at Al ("New York's is a government where...
the power of the Assembly speaker and the Senate majority leader over legislation is
almost absolute.").
28. See Raymond Hernandez, The Rent Debate: The Battleground; In Battle Over
Rent Law, Focus is on a Pivotal Republican Legislator, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1997, at
B1.
29. See James Dao, The Rent Debate: Battle; War of Nerves in Albany, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 6, 1997, § 1, at 1.
30. See Editorial, A Way to Compromise on Rents, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1997, at
A20 [hereinafter Editorial, A Way to Compromise on Rents].
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nants. Actually, Governor Pataki's position in relation to rent
regulation was clear enough to anyone who had been paying atten-
tion. Even though the Governor refused to set forth a specific pro-
posal on rent regulation for months after Senator Bruno's
announcement, he acknowledged in the immediate aftermath of
that announcement that he "supported Bruno's ultimate goal of
eliminating most rent regulations. '"31 His record as a legislator was
clearly anti-regulation. He voted against rent regulation extension
as an Assemblyman in 1989 and 1991; in 1993, as a State Senator,
"he voted to extend the laws, but largely because they added lux-
ury decontrol. ' 32 In 1995, he stated his support for vacancy decon-
trol, a system by which rent regulation is ended over time by
eliminating apartment from controls as soon as the incumbent ten-
ant leaves.33 If the press seemed, for the most part, not to know
where the Governor stood, rent regulation opponents were better
informed. Peter D. Salins of the conservative, anti-regulation
Manhattan Institute, for example, writing in January 1997, was pre-
pared to say unequivocally that Governor Pataki was "on the re-
cord as opposed to rent control."34
There was early and continuing speculation that Senator Bruno
and Governor Pataki were working in tandem, with Bruno taking
the "radical" position to permit Pataki to posture himself as a
"moderate." For example, even in the face of Senator Bruno's first
call for deregulation, the Director of the Real Estate Institute at
New York University asserted that he was "sure that's what will be
true .... Even if it isn't orchestrated in advance, politically, it's
inevitable that there will be a compromise, and then Pataki gets to
look like the savior."' 35 Despite repeated denials during the course
of the debate, it is clear from comments made by Senator Bruno
after that debate had concluded in June, 1997 that the speculation
was entirely correct: "I established a position which I knew was to
the far right," said Senator Bruno. "I knew where I would end up,
and where I wanted to end up was somewhere along the lines
31. See Pataki Urges Gradual End of Rent Laws, supra note 26, at B1.
32. See James Dao, Aides Say Pataki Favors Easing Some Limits on Rents, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 1997, at B6.
33. See id.
34. See Peter D. Salins, Rent Control's Last Gasp, CIrY J., Winter 1997, at 59. The
Manhattan Institute publishes City Journal. See About the Manhattan Institute, at
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/aboutmi.htm (last visited Sept. 29. 2003).
35. See P6rez-Pefia, supra note 13.
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where the governor was. ' '3 6 His only complaint was that the Gov-
ernor was forced to present his "compromise" position too soon.37
Senator Bruno acknowledged that the real goal of anti-regulation
forces was the adoption of vacancy decontrol, 38 the tactic previ-
ously endorsed by Governor Pataki in 1995. 39 Indeed, vacancy de-
control was at the top of the list of "first steps" towards full
decontrol that The New York Times, a leading voice of rent deregu-
lation, urged in December 1996 in the first of several anti-regula-
tion editorials.40
No one expected an early resolution to the battle over rent der-
egulation. Albany had a well-deserved reputation for legislative
brinksmanship, with little of importance ever resolved before the
last possible moment.41 Thus the first six months of 1997 would see
the arguments over rent regulations enacted and reenacted. For
opponents of rent regulation, success hinged on two sales pitches.
The first was an effort, as Peter Salins put it, to "convince the
state's opinion elite and the public at large that controls really are
harmful."42 The second was an effort to shift the question from
one of whether controls should be lifted to one of when controls
should be lifted; that is, to create the impression that elimination of
regulation was and should be inevitable, so that the only issue was
how to achieve that goal.43 On both counts, market theology in
general and market populism in particular were absolutely crucial.
Opposition to rent regulation was hardly a new phenomenon
amongst devotees of the market. In fact, rent regulation has long
been roundly condemned by almost all economists.4 4 "More than
93 percent of the members of the American Economics Associa-
tion surveyed by Alston, Kearl, and Vaughan (1992) agreed with
36. See Sarah Metzgar, Bruno Admits Regret Over Rent-Control Deal, TIMES
UNION (Albany), June 21, 1997, at Al.
37. See id.
38. See James Dao & Richard P6rez-Pefia, Rent War Redux: As Dust Settles, A
Tortuous Inside Story Emerges, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1997, § 1, at 1.
39. See Dao, supra note 32.
40. See Editorial, A Sensible Plan for Rent Decontrol, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1996,
§ 4, at 14.
41. See James Dao, Inside Albany: A Guide to Power Centers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
1994, § 13WC (Westchester Weekly), at 1 ("Most legislatures leave their toughest bat-
tles until the last possible moment, but in Albany brinksmanship has been taken to
new heights.").
42. See Salins, supra note 34, at 65.
43. See id.
44. See Andrejis Skaburskis & Michael B. Teitz, The Economics of Rent Regula-
tion, in RENT CONTROL: REGULATION AND THE RENTAL HOUSING MARKET, 41, 41
(W. Dennis Keating et al. eds., 1998).
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the statement: 'A ceiling on rent reduces the quantity and quality
of housing available."' 45 Yet scholarly and other opponents of rent
regulation-even those prepared to describe the system as a
"moral outrage"a6-had to build their argument in the face of the
fact that controls constrain landlords from raising rents to as high a
level as they desire to charge. As the authors of "Rent Control: An
Economic Abomination" acknowledged: the "short run" rent-low-
ering impact of regulation "cannot be denied."47
B. Key Market Populist Arguments
On a popular level, the most frequent argument against rent reg-
ulation was not an argument at all, but a paean to the magical
properties of the marketplace. Somehow, the song went, things
would just be better when unnatural constraints on the operation
of the market were lifted. Oftentimes, the bow to the market was
conjoined with specific arguments against regulation, but the depth
of the assumption of the virtue of the marketplace was best re-
flected in editorials like that of the Daily News, which opined, with-
out stating any justification, "A free housing market would only
benefit the city."'48 Newsday's anti-regulation editorial page was in-
formed by the feeling that, "If there has been one key lesson of the
'90s it is this: Governments impede free markets at their own
peril."4 9
If there were one argument that rent regulation opponents were
agreed upon, it was that regulation had hindered new construction,
and that the removal of regulation would free the market to create
enough housing to undo New York City's perennial housing
shortage. The benefits would not just be more and better housing,
but lower prices in a deregulated environment that caused there to
be greater supply in relation to demand. There were many varia-
tions on this theme, and all are instructive. Editorialists like those
in The New York Times and Wall Street Journal were among those
repeatedly charging that rent regulation discouraged construction
45. See id.
46. See Walter Block et al., Rent Control: An Economic Abomination, 11 INT'L J.
OF VALUE-BASED MGMT. 253, 253 (1998).
47. Id. at 254.
48. See Editorial, Spell School Safety: C-O-P-S/Something to Build On, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 22, 1997, at 30.
49. See Editorial, This is Your City... This is Your City on Rent Control, NEWS-
DAY, Apr. 13, 1997, at G1 [hereinafter Editorial, This is Your City].
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of new buildings. ° The New York Post wrote that rent regulation
had "all but wrecked what should be a thriving rental market by
effectively removing private-sector incentives to build new hous-
ing."' 51 Legislators, debating as though the fact were self-evident,
said that, "Rent control, as we know, inhibits new construction of
apartments. ' 52 Senator Bruno claimed that if rent regulation were
eliminated, the city would see an apartment-building boom.53
Because of the extent of New York's housing shortage, this argu-
ment was quite potent, and, as it was repeated so frequently, may
well have been influential in shaping opinion. After all, even regu-
lation advocates would have to weigh the supposed benefits of reg-
ulation against the clear harm of the loss of new housing. The
problem with the proposition that rent regulation reduced new
construction was that it ignored the state of the law: the fact was
that all new construction had for years been exempt from any type
of rent regulation. 4 Any developer was permitted to construct a
new residential building, and charge whatever that developer
wanted to charge.5 5 The only exception to this rule was the circum-
stance in which a developer was not prepared to build in the "free
market," but rather depend on governmentally-provided tax subsi-
dies.5 6 In that circumstance alone (New York's "421-a" program),
rent stabilization applied to a new building for a period of from ten
to twenty years.5 7 From 1981-1996, there were approximately
65,000 residential units, many of them rental units, that received
initial benefits under this program.5 8
Regulation opponents had a second argument which attempted
to link regulation with reduced construction, but this argument,
while repeated in anti-regulation circles, was not the focus of the
public campaign. According to this line of argument, landlords
were not actually inhibited by the fact that their new buildings
50. See A Sensible Plan for Rent Decontrol, supra note 40; Roger Starr, Editorial,
Rent Control Loses Its New York Lease, WALL ST. J., May 1, 1997, at A18.
51. See Editorial, Time to End the Rent Laws, N.Y. POST, Dec. 9, 1996, at 24.
52. See NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY DEBATE TRANSCRIPTS 66 (Mar. 17, 1997)
(statement of Mr. Balboni). All Assembly debate statements cited in this article were
made during the March 17, 1997 Assembly debate. See id.
53. See Joel Stashenko, Horseplay Aside, Bruno Vows Rent Control Change, TIMES
UNION (Albany), Jan. 12, 1997, at D5.
54. Emergency Tenant Protection Act ("EPTA") of 1974, 1974 N.Y. LAWS ch. 576.
55. See id.
56. See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421-a (2003).
57. See id. § 421-a(f); N.Y. CITY RENT GUIDELINES BD., 4 2 1A AND J-51 TAX
FAQ, at http://www.housingnyc.com/resources/faq/421a-J51.html (last visited Nov. 9,
2003).
58. See Markets & Trends, supra note 23, at app. G.6, at 124.
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would be subject to rent regulation (because they were not), but
they were still inhibited from building because of the fear that at
some time in the future controls might be re-imposed. Writing for
the Cato Institute, a conservative think tank, William Tucker ar-
gued that builders have learned that "any new housing in New
York risks being 'recaptured'. . . . Consequently, little new rental
housing is ever built. ' 59 The evidence cited by Tucker was the fact
that, in 1969, then New York City Mayor John Lindsay had said
that housing built after 1969 would not be rent regulated, but that
regulation was imposed on housing built between 1969 and 1974 by
the State Legislature pursuant to the Emergency Tenant Protection
Act of 1974 (the "ETPA").6 ° Indeed, the ETPA did place recent
new construction under regulation, although only in the face of the
State's brief experiment with vacancy decontrol, an experiment
that resulted in massive rent increases as well as multiple reports of
landlord harassment designed to cause tenants to vacate their
apartments. 61 While in the succeeding twenty-three years, all un-
subsidized new construction remained unregulated, regulation op-
ponents such as Assemblyman Faso insisted that, "There simply is
no confidence that the free market will continue to exist" once
buildings have been erected.62
Anthony Downs, another rent regulation opponent, also de-
scribed New York as having adopted a "double-cross strategy"
(i.e., placing new units that were supposed to be exempt from regu-
lation under control) that inhibits new construction.63 Downs's, A
Reevaluation of Residential Rent Control, actually claimed to have
empirical data to support the argument that the fear of follow-on
regulation caused a reduction in new construction. 64 He contrasted
the average annual new housing construction of 32,000 in the 1950s
and 37,000 in the 1960s, with averages of 17,000 in the 1970s and
59. WILLIAM TUCKER, THE CATO INSTITUTE, How RENT CONTROL DRIVES OUT
AFFORDABLE HOUSING, CATO POLICY ANALYSIS 13 (1997), available at http://
www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-274.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2003).
60. See id.
61. See TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON LIVING COSTS AND THE ECONOMY
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT ON HOUSING AND RENTS OF THE TEMPORARY
STATE COMMISSION ON LIVING COSTS AND THE ECONOMY OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 7 (1974).
62. See NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY DEBATE TRANSCRIPTS 121 (Mar. 17, 1997)
(statement of Mr. Faso).
63. See ANTHONY DOWNS, A REEVALUATION OF RESIDENTIAL RENT CONTROLS
48 (1996).
64. See id. at 125.
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10,400 in the 1980s.6 5 Describing the first two decades as the pe-
riod prior to stringent regulation, and the last two as during the
period of stringent regulation, he concludes that the decline oc-
curred because of regulation. 66 The only qualification made in re-
spect to the data is that they included both owner-occupied and
rental units.67
The analysis by Downs is very much characteristic of scholarly
opposition to regulation. Believing that "[r]ent control is basically
immoral and unjustified, ' 68 Downs sought to justify his view by
presenting seemingly scientific data (or theoretical models), but
failed to address fundamental questions in his analysis. Here,
Downs needed to determine whether the reduction in construction
was entirely caused by rent regulation, whether the reduction
merely coincided with stringent rent regulation, or whether the re-
duction was partially caused by rent regulation (and, if so, to what
extent). Among the questions that might have been asked about
the reduction in construction was the role of the federal govern-
ment in subsidizing suburban expansion while disinvesting in cities,
the role of massive out-migration of whites from New York (a net
of four million in the forty year period examined by Downs) and
the impact of neighborhood change, the role of New York City's
fiscal crisis in the mid-1970s, and the rise in construction costs.
Downs looked at none of these questions.
The other crucial factor not considered (or, at least, not acknowl-
edged) by those citing the fear of after-construction controls as a
reason builders did not build is simply the extent to which a builder
would actually be hurt by regulation even if such regulation were
imposed. If a developer were actually making a "free market" de-
cision about construction, that developer would have concluded
that the development would be profitable, and would set initial
rents at whatever the market would bear. Until such time as the
developer's fear of control came to be realized, the developer
would continue to receive market rents. Even if controls were ulti-
mately imposed, there has never been a case in New York where
existing rents were forced to be reduced. Thus, the only question
in terms of economic return would be the extent to which controls
would cut into profitability over time. And, as a 1997 study
65. See id. at 51.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See John Tierney, The Rentocracy: At the Intersection of Supply and Demand,
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1997, § 6 (Magazine), at 39 (quoting Downs).
3 9
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demonstrated, the cumulative increases granted by the Rent
Guidelines Board have historically exceeded the increases in the
costs borne by owners.69
The final argument linking regulation to the inhibition of new
construction was the one least frequently expressed, but perhaps
most revealing of the pro-market mindset. This argument did not
claim that new construction was regulated, or even that it would be
regulated in the future. The problem was the impact that existing
regulation had on prospective consumers of unregulated housing.
Because of regulation, Newsday complained, even developers of
luxury buildings have to "do business in a market rife with artifi-
cially cheap apartments." 70 The consequence, wrote Peter Salins, is
that regulation "discourages affluent tenants with rent discounts
from shopping around for the new apartments that developers
would build. '' 71 In other words, given the fact that developers were
unable or unwilling to construct housing that would compete with
regulated rents,72 what the developers needed was an environment
in which all had no choice but to compete for apartments that were
no longer "artificially cheap," but rather, apparently, "naturally"
more expensive.
The arguments about inhibition of new construction were "mar-
ket populist" only insofar as they promised more housing for eve-
ryone, and studiously avoided any mention that deregulation
equaled greater profit for landlords. What was needed were more
directly populist appeals with greater potential emotional and
pocketbook appeal, both to stoke resentment of regulation and to
ease fears about what the consequences of deregulation would be.
These arguments-notably that regulation was unfair to tenants be-
cause some tenants were rent-regulated and others were not, be-
cause it was unfair for wealthy tenants to enjoy the benefits of
regulation, and that deregulation would cause either relatively lim-
69. See OFF. OF N.Y. CITY PUB. ADVOCATE MARK GREEN, RENT DESTABILIZA-
TION STUDY II: AN ANALYSIS OF THE FAIRNESS TO LANDLORDS OF RENT INCREASES
GRANTED BY THE RENT GUIDELINES BOARD FOR STABILIZED APARTMENTS 4
(1997), available at http://www.housingnyc.com/research/pdf-reports/greenrent-
study.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2003). This study examined the period from 1976
through 1997. See id. at 10 tbl.1. The study's examination of the arguments about
overall landlord profitability is discussed infra, at text accompanying notes 125-127.
70. Editorial, This is Your City, supra note 49.
71. Salins, supra note 34, at 62.
72. This fact is essential to a consideration of the argument of regulation oppo-
nents that an unregulated market would result in lowered rents throughout the socio-
economic range of New York City tenants, a proposition discussed infra, at text
accompanying notes 218-230.
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ited rent rises (or even rent decreases)-were featured promi-
nently in the spring of 1997.73 Before turning to them, however, it
is important to examine an aspect of a debate that played out on
the floor of the New York State Assembly in March 1997.
C. The Debate in the Assembly
It has been said that "virtually no society treats the market as the
only criterion of social functioning. '74 The Assembly debate pro-
vided a tantalizing hint that the thinking of rent regulation oppo-
nents may well form an exception to that rule. Assemblyman Vito
Lopez, Chair of the Assembly's Housing Committee, had intro-
duced a bill that would have reauthorized rent regulation substan-
tially as it had existed.75 The bill was not thought to have any
chance to be passed into law, but was instead seen as "an opening
bid by the Assembly leadership in negotiations that all sides expect
to be highly contentious and to drag on through the legislative ses-
sion."'76 The debate on the bill, though, provided a window into the
contrasting views of members of the Assembly, and the language of
housing as home and community was starkly juxtaposed to the lan-
guage of housing as market.
Defenders of rent regulation argued that rent regulation contrib-
uted to neighborhood stability and economic integration, and that,
fundamentally, an apartment was a "home" to a renter in just the
same way as a standalone private dwelling is a "home" to its
owner. 77 Assemblyman Richard Gottfried, for example, pointed
out that "in New York City, rental housing is the way most people
live as their home."' 78 In the course of the debate, Assemblyman
Scott Stringer claimed that the attack on rent regulation:
[I]s really an attack on communities.... My community, 20, 25
years ago, was a community you would be afraid to walk in. It
was a community that literally you could get killed going to the
drug store. There were drugs, there was danger, the schools
were falling apart. And a bunch of pioneers, people who are
73. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 93-101.
74. Michael B. Teitz, A Social Perspective on Rent Control, in RENT CONTROL:
REGULATION AND THE RENTAL HOUSING MARKET 82 (W. Dennis Keating et al. eds.,
1998).
75. A. 2-A, 220th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997).
76. See Raymond Hernandez, Bill Would Bolster Rent Control Laws, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 1997, at B2.
77. See NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY DEBATE TRANSCRIPTS 170 (Mar. 17, 1997)
(statement of Mr. Gottfried).
78. Id.
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senior citizens today, arrived on the west side and in other parts
of the City and they set up their roots. They entered rent-regu-
lated apartments and they started to build those communities.
They build the school and the day-care centers. They created
the flavor and the life of these neighborhoods.79
Assemblyman Stringer described what those renter "pioneers" had
done was to have invested in their homes and neighborhoods.8 0
Similarly, Assemblyman Edward Sullivan said, "Within one or
two blocks, you can walk from apartments where people are rather
well off, to places where people are not so well off, and that is what
gives New York City its flavor, its character, its understanding of
one another, that's what creates a neighborhood in New York."" l
Finally, Assemblywoman Deborah Glick insisted that New Yorkers
enjoyed a social network, just like neighborhoods in other places:
"We just don't have it stretching down the block that curves
around a tree-lined street. We have that in our buildings that rise
up many, many stories."82
Recitations like those from the four Democratic members of the
Assembly cited above would normally be hardly remarkable. Dec-
larations praising the values of home and neighborhood have long
been the bread-and-butter of legislators. It is certainly true that a
variety of developments in the last thirty years have contributed to
"the destruction of a sense of place and to the transformation of
America into a country of exiles." 3 Nevertheless, there was and
remains a "living sense of a boundaried place," a sense that "al-
ways has a provincial character" and which "takes shape first as
connections to families and friends, then to neighborhoods, towns,
and regions, and finally, to the nation and the world."8 4
What is remarkable is that one of the principal concerns ex-
pressed by rent regulation opponents was that rent regulation
makes people less mobile than city dwellers should be. As Assem-
blyman Balboni complained, "People stay in their neighborhoods
79. NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY DEBATE TRANSCRIPTS 73-74 (Mar. 17, 1997)
(statement of Mr. Stringer).
80. See id. at 78.
81. NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY DEBATE TRANSCRIPTS 162-63 (Mar. 17, 1997)
(statement of Mr. Sullivan).
82. NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY DEBATE TRANSCRIPTS 141 (Mar. 17, 1997)
(statement of Ms. Glick).
83. WILLIAM LEACH, COUNTRY OF EXILES: THE DESTRUCTION OF PLACE IN
AMERICAN LIFE 181 (1999).
84. Id. at 180.
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forever." 5 Even though people "are supposed to move," he con-
tinued, "New York City is practically five times as bad" in terms of
mobility as other cities. "In other words, for every one year that
somebody stays in an apartment in Houston, New Yorkers stay
there five years." The problem with rent regulation, Balboni con-
cluded, is that the system "give[s] the people something they want
to hold on to forever. 8 6
Had Assemblyman Balboni been able to imagine that a renter's
apartment was his home, he would surely have been less troubled
that some renters would want to hold on to their homes for a long
time. This, after all, is precisely what homeowners in New York
City do. Based on an analysis of information contained in the Cen-
sus Bureau's 1996 Housing Vacancy Survey (the year closest to the
debate), it turns out that fully 43.3 percent of owners were living in
their homes for sixteen years or more, compared to only 26.1 per-
cent of non-rent stabilized renters and only 21.6 percent of rent
stabilized renters.8 7 At the other end of the longevity-of-occu-
pancy spectrum, only 31.5 percent of owners were living in their
homes for five years or less, whereas 53.6 percent of non-rent stabi-
lized renters and 58.3 percent of rent stabilized renters were in
their homes for that period of time. 8 In short, renters were more
mobile than owners, but still not mobile enough for rent regulation
opponents.
For Assemblyman Balboni, as with other opponents of rent reg-
ulation, an apartment was not so much a home for its user, but an
asset to be deployed by its landlord owner. The Assemblyman
85. NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY DEBATE TRANSCRIPTS 67 (Mar. 17, 1997)
(statement of Mr. Balboni).
86. Id. at 68.
87. Data from the Census Bureau's 1996 Housing and Vacancy Survey was in-
cluded in Housing NYC: Rents, Markets & Trends '97. See MARKETS & TRENDS,
supra note 23, app. D1 at 94-95, app. D.3 at 104-07. Integrating that information, one
can derive the following:
Owner- % of Non-stabilized % of Stabilized % of
Year Moved in Occupied total rentals total rentals total
834,183 931,414 1,014,751
93-96 166,949 20.01 345,560 37.10 402,889 39.70
90-92 95,929 11.50 153,516 16.48 188,202 18.55
87-89 92,499 11.09 79,748 8.56 78,891 7.77
84-86 67,989 8.15 62,172 6.68 62,921 6.20
81-83 49,823 5.97 48,427 5.20 62,092 6.12
71-80 167,575 20.09 124,613 13.38 159,916 15.76
prior to 71 193,420 23.19 118,376 12.71 58,841 5.80
88. See MARKETS & TRENDS, supra note 23, at 104.
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seemed genuinely shocked when his colleague, Scott Stringer, had
described the way that rent-regulated tenants had invested in
neighborhoods as follows:
[Y]ou have said on two different occasions during your discus-
sion the word 'investment.' What do you mean by 'investment'?
Now, because have we changed the debate suddenly? Because
these are people who are not .. .invested in a housing [sic],
right, they don't own the housing, they are renting, right? Cor-
rect? Is that correct?89
The concept that investment could take the form not only of fi-
nancial equity but "sweat equity" as well was entirely foreign to
Mr. Balboni. Another rent regulation opponent, Assemblyman
Faso, in an example of the red-baiting that surfaced periodically in
the Spring of 1997, pled for deregulation in these terms: "[M]y
goodness, they have abolished rent control in Ho Chi Minh City,
but somehow we can't seem to whip up the strength to realize the
laws of supply and demand in New York City."' 90
When the Democratic-controlled Assembly passed the Lopez
reauthorization bill on March 17th, there was still approximately
three months to go before what was seen as the June 15th deadline
for resolution, and Governor Pataki was still playing his cards close
to the vest. A week later, the Governor even proclaimed that "he
had no plans to offer his own proposal for changing the state's rent
regulations, arguing that the most productive role for him would be
to stay above the fray to broker a compromise between Democrats
who want to maintain the current system and Republicans who
want to abolish many protections for tenants." 91 In the meantime,
opponents of regulation went about the business of trying to
demonstrate that it was they who were supportive of the average
New Yorker. 92
D. Wealthy Tenants?
A central market populist argument was that rent stabilization
really only benefited a wealthy few. "What is perhaps most galling
about rent regulation in New York City," wrote Peter Salins, "is
89. NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY DEBATE TRANSCRIPTS 77 (Mar. 17, 1997)
(statement of Mr. Balboni).
90. NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY DEBATE TRANSCRIPTS 114 (Mar. 17, 1997)
(statement of Mr. Faso).
91. See Pataki Offers to Mediate in Rent-Control Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26,
1997, at B4.
92. See discussion infra Parts I.D-E.
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that the housing scarcity it generates affects the entire city while its
benefits fall to a select few. Cocktail-party talk about movie stars
who pay a song for luxury apartments isn't so far off the mark."
9 3
This assertion was repeatedly driven home by anti-regulation advo-
cates. In perhaps the most widely circulated story-the cover story
in the Sunday magazine of The New York Times-John Tierney
emphasized that, "Most of the good deals go to people with above-
average incomes in Manhattan's best neighborhoods. ' 94 The edito-
rial page of The Times argued that the system "creates an absurdly
inequitable system protecting some well-to-do tenants at the ex-
pense of others." 95 The editorial in Crain's New York Business was
almost identical: "[M]ost of the benefits [of rent regulation] go to
well-off New Yorkers in the trendiest neighborhoods." 96 Joseph
Strasburg, the head of the Rent Stabilization Association, the ma-
jor landlord trade group in New York, also focused on Manhattan
tenants: many of them "don't need protection because they are
people of means, many of them who own second homes. Who are
we protecting here?" 97
The broad goal of these arguments was to paint rent regulation
as inequitable. The more targeted goal was to lower the tenant
income level at which at occupied apartments that rented for
$2,000 a month or more would be deregulated. The existing level
was annual income of $250,000, but proposals surfaced in the
course of the debate to cut that level to as low as $125,000.98 Three
simple tests demonstrate that the professed concern about unfairly
protecting the wealthy was no more than market populist rhetoric.
First, even though "the debate has centered on those seen as abus-
ing the system by receiving subsidies they do not need," The Times
reported, Census Bureau statistics showed that "only 5 percent of
those families in rent-regulated apartments report yearly incomes
of more than $100,000." 99 An even smaller percentage of fami-
lies-"0.35 percent of the 1.1 million regulated tenants"-had in-
93. Salins, supra note 34, at 62.
94. See Tierney, supra note 68.
95. See Editorial, A Leader Needed on Rent Control, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1997, at
A14.
96. See Editorial, Reform Rent Laws, supra note 2, at 8.
97. See Katti Gray, Rent Law Test Set in Albany, NEWSDAY, Apr. 5, 1997, at A16.
98. Michael Slackman & Ellen Yan, Swing Vote in Rent Wars, NEWSDAY, June 5,
1997, at A36.
99. See Adam Nagourney, Ads Seek to Push Pataki and D'Amato Into Debate on
Rent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1997, at B1.
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come over $250,000.100 Thus, the overwhelming benefits of
regulation were not in fact going to the wealthy.
Second, the means sought to be used to correct the supposed
abuse-luxury decontrol-was not actually targeted at the prob-
lem that had been identified. If the concern had actually been to
prevent wealthy tenants from securing a windfall via regulation,
then one solution might have been to impose a surcharge on the
rents of such tenants, a surcharge payable into an fund for the de-
velopment of affordable housing. Then, when the wealthy tenant
moved out, the next tenant could be of moderate means, because
the apartment itself would still be regulated. But the actual goal of
regulation opponents, naturally enough, is deregulating units.
Thus, in the guise of fighting a relatively unpopular beneficiary of
regulation, the means selected effectively remove the apartment
from ever being affordable to anyone but a wealthy tenant. It is a
measure of the success of market populist rhetoric that the mis-
match between means and ends was never commented upon
throughout the debate.
Third, the supporters of "luxury decontrol" had to ignore their
usual arguments about the importance of maintaining a tax base in
New York City in order to put forward their market populism.
This fact went almost entirely unremarked upon throughout the
course of the debate. It was, however, clearly summarized by As-
semblyman Richard Gottfried:
I was thinking if someone were to propose that taxes that the
[wealthy] couple pay be increased by $100 a year, maybe, or
$1,000 a year, oh my God, you would think someone was pro-
posing the French Revolution. We would hear about how if you
raise the taxes on that... couple, my God, they would flee New
York. They would take their productivity with them... But if
the rent laws are not preserved . . . we'd be authorizing their
landlord [to raise their rent upwards of thousands of dollars per
month]. Now, am I missing something? If we raise their taxes
ever so slightly, that would be a disaster for the City's economy,
for the State's economy. But if we take thousands of dollars,
tens of thousands of dollars from them to put in their landlord's
pocket, somehow that's okay. 0 a
100. See Deborah Sontag, Up With Their Rents! Albany Aims at the Rich, N.Y.
TIMES, May 2, 1997, at Al.
101. NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY DEBATE TRANSCRIPTS 174-75 (Mar. 17, 1997)
(statement of Mr. Gottfried).
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E. Impoverished Landlords?
If the technique of market populism demanded that tenants be
wealthy, it likewise demanded that landlords be small-scale and
struggling. Describing a Crain's New York Business breakfast fo-
rum with Senator Bruno, anti-regulation advocate Alair Town-
send's rhetorical device was to feign having "assumed the worst"
when she saw "a group of men in short-sleeved cotton shirts, no
ties or jackets, clustered at a rear table" (i.e., she assumed that pro-
tenant advocates had infiltrated the forum).1 °2 But in fact, Town-
send said, delivering her moral with a flourish, "They turned out to
be owners of small residential buildings. So much for the stereo-
type of the rich, sharp-suited landlords against middle-class tenants
struggling to stay in the city."'0 3 In the Assembly debate, Assem-
blyman Winner rose to make "a plea on behalf of some of those
small landlords, small property owners that made major invest-
ments of whatever their life saving might have been with regard to
these small pieces of real property in the City of New York to find
their inability to get any kind of a modicum rate of return on their
investment." 104 The Times editorialized that it was particularly im-
portant to pay attention "to the problems of small landlords.""1 5
As was the case with the tactic treating wealthy tenants as repre-
sentative of the beneficiaries of rent regulation, the picture of the
small landlord being representative of landlords in general was
quite misleading. In fact, buildings with fewer than six apartments
are exempt from rent regulation. 10 6 According to a study by the
New York City Rent Guidelines Board, using data derived from
the Census Bureau's 1996 Housing and Vacancy Survey, 44.7 per-
cent of rent stabilized apartments are in buildings with 50 units or
more, and 77.2 percent are in buildings with 20 units or more.0 7
Statistics on concentration of ownership are more difficult to come
by, but a 1985 report for the Rent Stabilization Association showed
that "71 percent of New York City's rental apartments were owned
102. Alair Townsend, Rent Regs Send Most Pols for Cover, So Hooray for Stand-Up
Guy Bruno, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., Mar. 10, 1997, at 9.
103. Id.
104. NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY DEBATE TRANSCRIPTS 215 (Mar. 17, 1997)
(statement of Mr. Winner).
105. Editorial, End the Stalemate on Rent Laws, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1997, at A24
[hereinafter Editorial, End the Stalemate on Rent Laws].
106. See Rent Stabilization Code, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9,
§ 2520.11(d) (2003).
107. See HOUSING AND VACANCY, supra note 4.
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by only 12 percent of landlords. 1 °8 A 1987 report found that 56
percent of rent stabilized units were owned by 5 percent of the
members of the Rent Stabilization Association. 10 9
The financial clout wielded by anti-regulation forces was not of a
scope that can be generated by mom-and-pop landlords. "In the
five years leading up to the [spring 1997] battle over rent controls,
New York City landlords and developers mounted a quiet con-
certed effort to build their influence in state government through a
large increase in campaign contributions, with one of the stated
aims being to do away with the rent laws." 110 For example, the
political action committee of the Rent Stabilization Association
had not contributed to state campaigns until 1992.11 In the five
years running up to the 1997 debate over deregulation, however, it
"gave almost $750,000 ... making it one of the biggest players in
state politics." 1 2 In addition, a tight group of big real estate inter-
ests in New York City directly gave "more than $1.1 million to state
campaigns and party committees since the start of 1993, over-
whelmingly to Republicans."11 3 As the Rent Stabilization Associa-
tion's leader described his group's long-term effort: "If elected
officials know you're going to be there for them, there's more com-
fort there for them to do the right thing." '114
As another weapon in their market populist arsenal, anti-regula-
tion advocates asserted that regulation hurt tenants by causing
buildings to be abandoned. Republicans repeatedly claimed that
"the rent laws force landlords to abandon up to 19,000 housing
units annually because they cannot get a reasonable return on their
investment." 1 5 Regulation was also regularly blamed for what
Newsday characterized as "scandalously bad maintenance in many
buildings."'"1 6 The theme of rent regulation causing deterioration
of housing stock was also a mainstay of both popular and scholarly
opposition to rent regulation. Peter Salins wrote that the cost of
108. See JARRETr & McKEE, supra note 14, at 10.
109. See Michael B. Teitz, The Politics of Rent Control, in RENT CONTROL: RFOU-
LATION AND THE RENTAL HOUSING MARKET, 61, 71 (W. Dennis Keating et al. eds.,
1998).
110. See Richard Pdrez-Pefia, Landlords Quietly Increased Donations to Fight Rent
Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1997, at Al.
111. See id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See John Caher, Thousands Rally at State Capitol for Rent Control, TIMES
UNION (Albany), May 21,1997, at Al.
116. See Editorial, This is Your City, supra note 49.
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rent regulation was "decades of deferred maintenance and substan-
dard services. '117 The authors of The Maze of Urban Housing
Markets used an econometric analysis to try to demonstrate that,
"regardless of the exact nature of the upsurge in housing demand
presumed to stimulate the policy response of rent control, owners
of existing rental dwellings will be encouraged to downgrade them
so as to improve their rate of return." 1 8 In almost identical lan-
guage, Charles de Seve, in a report for the Rent Stabilization Asso-
ciation, wrote that regulation "forces owners to erode their own
investments by making capital maintenance unaffordable." 119
The arguments about both abandonment and inadequate main-
tenance are largely, though not entirely, dependent on the proposi-
tion that owning a rent-regulated building in New York City is an
unprofitable enterprise, and that mechanisms are not available ei-
ther to compensate landlords for needed improvements to their
buildings or for hardship that individual landlords might experi-
ence. In fact, landlords have been entitled to get rent increases
whenever they make capital improvements. 20 Notably, the costs
of building-wide capital improvements were not only recoverable
over the course of seven years; the rent increases that were permit-
ted to compensate the landlord for such improvements become
permanent increases that give the landlord a continuing return
even after the cost of the improvements has been fully paid for by
the tenants. 12' In the case of individual apartment improvements,
these costs could be recovered on a more rapid 40-month sched-
ule.' 22 Here, too, a landlord could continue to collect the rent in-
crease even after the tenant had fully paid for the improvement. 123
The question of profitability is one that cannot be answered with
precision because landlords have consistently rejected any effort to
117. Salins, supra note 34, at 63.
118. JEROME ROTHENBERG ET AL., THE MAZE OF URBAN HOUSING MARKETS:
THEORY, EVIDENCE AND POLICY 337 (1991).
119. CHARLES W. DE SEVE, RENT STABILIZATION ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK
CITY, INC., THE EFFECT OF DEREGULATION ON RENTS & ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN
NEW YORK CITY 2 (1997).
120. See RSL § 26-511(c)(6) (1969).
121. See RSL § 26-511(c)(6)(b).
122. For the mechanisms to determine both building-wide and individual apartment
improvements, see the Rent Stabilization Code, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9,
§ 2522.4 (2003).
123. See id. § 2522.4(1). Note, however, that in the case of individual apartment
improvements, it is only when the apartment was vacant that the landlord was able to
make the unilateral decision to effect improvements. See id. In the case of occupied
apartments, the tenant generally had to consent to improvements. See id.
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have them open their books.' 24 The available indicators, however,
show clearly that the arguments about rent-regulated housing be-
ing unprofitable were based more rhetoric and ideology than on
empirical data. The analysis by New York City's Office of Public
Advocate compared the rent increases granted by the City's Rent
Guidelines Board from the period 1976 through 1997 with the rent
increase that would have been necessary to maintain landlords' net
operating income ("NOI"). 12 5 Based on a series of one-year leases,
with increases compounded from year-to-year, the total increases
granted were 210 percent, compared to the 143 percent that would
have been necessary to maintain NOI. 26 Based on a series of two
year leases, the same comparison showed a difference no less than
127 percent granted, versus 99.8 percent needed to maintain NOI.
The study, looking at a period from 1989 to 1995, also found that
even using an inflation-adjusted measure by the Rent Guidelines
Board-one that unrealistically inflates the cost of landlords' debt
service-landlord income had "kept pace with inflation.' 1 27 The
Rent Guidelines Board, in a report published in October 1997 (i.e.,
after the conclusion of the debate) found, according to the sample
of buildings it surveyed that "[r]ents and revenues rose faster than
operating costs in the City's [rent] stabilized stock for the third
year in a row, causing Net Operating Income ... to increase by an
average of 8%. ' '128
Obviously, not all rental properties operate in the black. The
same Rent Guidelines Board report referred to above found that
approximately nine percent of the buildings sampled "faced costs
that exceeded revenues.' 1 29 It is nevertheless the case that any
landlord was permitted under the existing rules of rent stabilization
to apply for rent increases based on financial hardship,130 so that
claims of hardship would appear to be highly exaggerated. Cer-
tainly, there has been no documentation of any pattern whereby
124. See Bob Liff, Rent Control on Hot Seat, NEWSDAY, May 11, 1992, at 19 (citing
New York City Council member Tom Duane calling on "landlords to open up their
records.").
125. See OFF. OF N.Y. CITY PuB. ADVOCATE MARK GREEN, supra note 69, at 4-5.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 8.
128. MARKETS & TRENDS, supra note 23, at app. D.2. at 38.
129. Id. at 48.
130. See Rent Stabilization Code N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2522.4(b);
RSL § 26-511(c)(6).
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landlords in financial hardship have been refused requested rent
increases.131
Arguments about maintenance and profitability may be most in-
teresting for what they reveal about the presumed nature of the
market and the appropriate responses to the operation of that mar-
ket. One does not have to look to pro-regulation advocates for
arguments that the only concern of landlords is how they can maxi-
mize their returns. The Maze of Urban Housing Markets describes,
as a scientific certainty that can be graphed,132 the response of
landlords to controls on the rents they can charge: "the owner will
attempt to downgrade the dwelling to [a lower-quality submarket]
in order to maximize returns."'1 33 The anti-regulation advocate Pe-
ter Salins described this phenomenon in blunt terms: "As a class,
landlords are neither altruistic nor dumb, so they pass along the
cost of rent regulation as best they can.' 1 34 Arthur Zabarkes, who
has both managed buildings and been the director of the Real Es-
tate Institute at New York University, 135 was likewise direct about
his practices:
At unregulated apartments we'd do most things that the tenants
requested. But on the rent-regulated units, we did absolutely
only what the law required. It was sad. There were people with
15-amp fuses from 1947 that couldn't handle an air conditioner,
but we weren't legally required to replace them, so we didn't.
We had a perverse incentive to make those tenants unhappy.
With regulated apartments, the ultimate objective is to get people
out of the building.'36
The assumption that the drive to maximize profits is the normal
state of affairs first of all sheds light on the actual concerns of those
who, like The Times, complained that rent regulation "deprived
131. See Bob Liff, Rent Control on Hot Seat, NEWSDAY, May 11, 1992, at 19 (citing
New York City Council member Tom Duane calling on "landlords to open up their
records"). The State Division of Housing and Community Renewal refused this au-
thor's request, pursuant to the New York Freedom of Information Law, PuB. OFF.
LAW §§ 84-90 (2001), for data on the number of hardship applications made by land-
lords of New York City rent-regulated buildings for the period from 1997-2002, and
the number of such applications approved and rejected. See letter from N.Y. State
Div. of Hous. and Cmty. Renewal to Craig Gurian (July 10, 2002) (on file with au-
thor). In rejecting the request, the agency wrote that it "does not maintain a list of
said information in the form stated in your request." See id. On July 23, 2002, the
author appealed, in writing, this rejection; the author has received no response.
132. See ROTHENBERG ET AL., supra note 118, at 336 for the graph.
133. Id. at 337.
134. See Salins, supra note 34, at 63.
135. See Tierney, supra note 68.
136. See id. (emphasis added).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXI
landlords of a fair return on their apartment buildings. '137 If one
posits that these anti-regulation forces have conflated the idea of
"fair return" with the idea of "maximum return," their position is
entirely understandable: rent regulation does indeed limit one's
ability to maximize one's return. It also suggests how the idea of
the market as a natural and unalterable force is so important to the
shape of policy responses. To the extent that the market is seen
almost as a force of nature, the most plausible response is to adapt
to its demands, not quixotically to try to alter the market to corre-
spond with other values. The only way the authors of The Maze of
Urban Housing Markets were able to perform their econometrics
was to assume, "as is typical, that there are no proscriptions against
downgrading the dwelling." '138 Having such proscriptions in place,
however, is certainly not impossible to imagine: even adequate
light, air, and space in apartments were not the result of late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century landlord volunteerism but of
the imposition of housing codes. 139 The standards in those codes,
as has been done before, could be raised,'140 and enforcement en-
hanced.141 But, at least as rent regulation opponents read the polit-
ical landscape, market ideology was so much in the ascendancy
that, with the exception of denunciations of government regulation
in general, they never even felt the need to address the possibility
that better maintenance could be achieved by having the market
adapt to more effective regulation. Their unquestioned assumption
was that adaptation to the market was always the best solution.
137. Editorial, A Way to Compromise on Rents, supra note 30.
138. ROTHENBERG ET AL., supra note 118, at 336.
139. The Tenement House Law of 1867, for example, required any multiple dwell-
ing to have a fire ladder, a privy for every twenty tenants, and connections between
inside rooms and those receiving outside air directly. See Joel Schwartz, Housing, in
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK 565, 566 (Kenneth T. Jackson ed., 1995).
140. After landlords, "seeking to maximize their rental space" tried to satisfy the
room-connection requirement of the The Tenement House Law of 1867 by building
shafts and transoms, authorities passed the Tenement House Law of 1879, which re-
quired air and light directly for interior rooms. See id. The Tenement House Law of
1901, in turn, prohibited inside rooms without windows and additionally required fire
escapes and separate privies for each family in a multiple dwelling. See id. at 567.
141. The 1901 Act, for example, also created the Tenement House Department,
which "pressured the landlords of old law buildings to comply with the new code." See
id. It may well be true, as the authors of The Maze of Urban Housing Markets can-
didly acknowledged in a footnote, that, to the extent that proscriptions do currently
exist, "there is no effective administrative machinery to monitor and punish or roll
back such downgrading." See ROTHENBERG ET AL., supra note 118, at 355 n.2. A lack
of enforcement, however, is not a necessary state of affairs.
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F. The Debate Intensifies
The unanimity of newspaper editorials to the contrary, the fight
over rent regulation was not at all one-sided. As spring ap-
proached, tenants and their allies became more and more active.
In late February, for example, more than 3,000 people demon-
strated at City Hall Park in favor of continuing rent regulations. a42
In mid-March, the New York State Tenants and Neighbors Coali-
tion began a drive to persuade three Republican State Senators
from Nassau County (which had 17,000 rent regulated apartments)
to abandon State Senate Majority Leader Bruno and vote to ex-
tend the then-existing regulations. 143 By the end of March, the bat-
tle had intensified: tenants in particular were continuing to target
"Senate Republicans whose city and suburban districts include
thousands of rent-regulated apartments.
' 144
The initial showdown in the Senate came on April 7th. The Sen-
ate, like the Assembly, operated largely by one-person rule.
145
Without Senator Bruno's support, a proposal to extend rent regula-
tions would normally be doomed to languish in Committee. Dem-
ocrats in the Senate pushed for a test vote by making a motion to
discharge the pro-regulation bill from Committee. The bid failed
by a vote of 33 to 27, with only two Republicans-Goodman of
Manhattan and Padavan of Queens-voting with the Democrats. 146
There were, however, two additional Republicans who voted
against the motion: Velella of the Bronx and Spano of Westchester,
who said "they supported extending the rent laws, but did not want
to vote against their majority leader" on a procedural vote chal-
lenging his authority.147 Thus, despite the fact that anti-regulation
legislators prevailed, it was clear that Senator Bruno's margin for
an ultimate showdown on regulation was perilously narrow.
At the same time, a landlord-sponsored study, which had been
completed in March, began to circulate widely. The study, pre-
pared for the Rent Stabilization Association by economist Charles
142. See Merle English, Tenant Groups Rally Over Rent Control, NEWSDAY, Feb.
27, 1997, at A29.
143. See Jessica Kowal, Nassau is Focus in State Battle on Rent Ceilings, NEWSDAY,
Mar. 13, 1997, at A8.
144. See Michael Finnegan, Rent Regs War Heating Up: Tenants and Landlords In
Battle Royal, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 31, 1997, at 8.
145. See McKinley, supra note 27.
146. See First Volley Fired in Rent War/Democrats Sought Vote to Extend System,
NEWSDAY, Apr. 8, 1997, at A6.
147. See James Dao, G.O.P. Wins First Test in Albany in an Effort to End Rent
Controls, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1997, at Al.
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de Seve, created a sensation. The purpose of the study was to focus
on the benefits of deregulation, and to assure the public that
"[f]ear of large rent increases is ill-founded."'' 14 Mr. de Seve wrote
that the projected average post-deregulation citywide rent in-
crease, excluding Manhattan, would be "only 8.32%.' 49 But his
study also predicted post-deregulation increases in Manhattan of
more than 50 percent for regulated units on the Upper West Side,
and increases of almost 30 percent in Greenwich Village and on the
Upper East Side. Increases in Queens were estimated to average
between 13.7 percent and 19.4 percent.
150
Charles de Seve and his sponsors may have underestimated the
level of concern that could be raised by their numbers for at least
two reasons. First, the numbers fit neatly into the market populist
argument that the greatest benefits from regulation flowed to a ge-
ographically-limited elite. Thus, there appeared to be an opportu-
nity to drive a wedge between different groups of tenants and,
hopefully, to make it politically easier for outer borough politicians
to oppose rent regulation. The second was that it apparently did
not occur to de Seve that the massive increases in some neighbor-
hoods could be "bad" in terms of loss of economic integration or in
any other respect. Noting the greater predicted increases in some
Manhattan neighborhoods, he wrote: "[T]hat is as is should be as
the market takes account of the differential value of land through-
out the City. ' 151 Indeed, the de Seve study was unselfconscious in
its pro-market boosterism. If there were a range of views within
market theology, de Seve's version was fundamentalist.
G. The Beauty of the Market
In de Seve's view, there really was an "invisible hand" at work.
It is not as though landlords determine rents; instead, "[t]he mar-
ket imposes its own limits in response to the interaction of supply
and demand." '152 However much landlords might wish to charge
more, they "cannot overcome the power of the free market. '" 153
Landlords would take the opportunity to make improvements, and
then tenants would be able to choose from among "apartment se-
lections throughout New York City having a wide variation in
148. DE SEVE, supra note 119, at 1.
149. See id. at 7.
150. See id. at 8.
151. See id. at 5.
152. See id. at 3.
153. See id.
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price, quality and location." 154 For de Seve, part of tenant choice
might include making some adjustments. The solution for some
tenants "who want a higher quality or better located apartment
than might be affordable" might be to "pool their resources.' 1 55 In
order to pay for improvements, tenants who did not choose to relo-
cate "will forego some other expenditures to pay higher rents.'
'1 56
The expenditures that tenants might choose not to make were not
specified. Mr. de Seve did not use the term "filtering" (let alone
"trickle down"), but his view was consonant with what many econ-
omists believed would occur if apartments were deregulated.
When rent regulation is removed, the operation of the market (i.e.,
higher prices) "prompts tenants to move from apartments too large
for their needs, that induces landlords to upgrade existing buildings
and developers to construct new ones." '157 Over time, these econo-
mists thought, "affordable housing will filter down to all segments
of the population.' 15
8
The widespread belief in the goodness of the market is based on
the idea that its operation works to the benefit of all participants.
In theory, tenants would be satisfied with the quality and features
of their apartments, and, at the same time, builders would be satis-
fied by the mix of apartments they would be able to put on the
market. Housing markets are, of course, dynamic, so it is not as
though the theoretical point of perfect equilibrium is always
achieved. On the contrary, the equilibrium of the market is con-
stantly subject to disturbances. When this happens, equilibrium is
supposedly restored by "supply transformation responses." On the
landlord side, these responses include new construction and the
conversion of units from one sub-market to another. On the con-
sumer side, the responses might include downsizing or changing
neighborhood. The authors of The Maze of Urban Housing Mar-
kets made the consumer side of the process seem simple and pain-
less: consumers are able to participate in restoring equilibrium
simply by "chang[ing] their desired housing configurations. 159
And, the consumers are not hurt in the process: "mutually advanta-
154. See id. at 2.
155. See id. at 3.
156. See id. at 6.
157. Dennis Hevesi, Deregulation: A Seismic Shift, Intensity Unknown, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 1997, § 9, at 5.
158. See id.
159. ROTHENBERG ET AL., supra note 118, at 183.
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geous shifting [is] guaranteed so long as there is taste heterogeneity
among households. 16°
The market knows, and the market speaks. It gives its signals by
changes in rents caused by supply-and-demand imbalances,
changes that tell developers, investors, and owners what to do. As
Anthony Downs explains this analysis, in the circumstance of inad-
equate supply it is essential that rents go up: this is the only effec-
tive signal that additional units should be built.16 1 A key to this
view of a smoothly and appropriately functioning market, explicitly
acknowledged by Downs, is the assumption that holds "that strong
competition exists among owners of existing rental units, among
potential developers of additional units, and among tenants.' '1 62
When combined with the ability of developers to enter the rental
market freely and build as they so choose, "movements of rents
effectively signal-and call forth-changes in resource allocation
that are both socially desirable and efficient. 163
The assumption that rental housing markets in New York City
could be truly competitive without regulation, and therefore that
housing consumers would be able to "choose," is the same way that
housing producers can choose, was crucial to both the program and
the political well-being of regulation opponents. If the assumption
were to go unquestioned, Governor Pataki's desire (as his aides
allowed he wanted) for "an orderly transition to a market system"
would be seen as a desire for housing market results that were "so-
cially desirable and efficient" for all."6 If the competitiveness as-
sumption came to be debated, let alone came to seem implausible
in the New York City rental housing context, the Governor's desire
might be seen very differently, either as a reflection of his simply
wanting to enhance the profits of landlords, or at least as a reflec-
tion that imposing market values was more important to him than
any social impact on tenants. While it is not possible to know for
sure whether deregulation advocates in general, or Governor
Pataki in particular, actually believed that rental housing markets
in New York City could be competitive, it is certainly the case that
they acted as though they did. The merit to the assumption of
competiveness will be examined later in this study.16 5
160. See id.
161. See DOWNS, supra note 63, at 23.
162. See id. at 24.
163. See id.
164. See Dao, supra note 32.
165. See infra Part I.L accompanying notes 271-296.
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H. Vacancy Decontrol Takes Center Stage
1. Pressure on the Governor
Regardless of what assumptions were in his head and in his
heart, the Governor, as April wore on, had to be feeling more and
more pressure to come out into the open and declare what he
wanted to be done. The Times, his editorial ally on rent regulation,
urged him to put forward his own plan, saying that, "The current
situation demands a Governor who is willing and able to lead.'
'1 66
By the end of April, state Democratic officials said that they
"would start an advertising campaign urging voters to hold Gov.
George E. Pataki and [United States] Senator Alphonse M.
D'Amato personally responsible if the State Legislature allows
rent control laws to expire. "167 The reporting on the advertising
campaign pointed out what was described as the central fact in the
rent regulation dispute: that "Mr. Pataki and Mr. D'Amato are the
most powerful Republicans in the state and have the clout and the
motivation to heavily influence the outcome of the dispute. ' 168 A
few days later, Newsday, another Pataki ally in the fight against
rent regulation, weighed in with its call for the Governor to put
forth a plan.169 Newsday editorialized that "It's time for D'Amato
and Pataki to earn their keep."' 70
2. Vacancy Decontrol, But Don't Worry
At the end of April, the Governor was still trying to acclimate
New Yorkers to the idea that there was no option but that rent
regulation had to change. His "main focus during an afternoon
press conference was on what he depicted as the inevitable end of
the city's current rent-control system.' 17' By mid-May, just five
weeks before the scheduled expiration of rent regulations, Gover-
nor Pataki could hold out no more. He began to lay out what he
sought to describe as a pro-tenant compromise. "Repeatedly using
the words 'fair' and 'balanced' to describe his plan, Mr. Pataki
proudly suggested ... that he had found a way to split the differ-
166. A Leader Needed on Rent Control, supra note 95.
167. See Nagourney, supra note 99.
168. See id.
169. See Editorial, Out of Control/Pataki or D'Amato Must Broker a Reasonable
Compromise on New York Rent Laws, NEWSDAY, May 2, 1997, at A38.
170. Id.
171. See Frederic U. Dicker, Pataki: Kiss Our Current Rent Laws Goodbye, N.Y.
POST, Apr. 30, 1997, at 7.
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ence between Republicans and Democrats. ' 172  His spin was
picked up by the headline of the first Times article on the story:
"Entering Debate, Governor Offers Rent Compromise. ' 173 The
Associated Press, as carried by the Albany Times Union, was even
more faithful to the Governor's script: "Pataki's Rent Control Plan
Seeks Middle Ground," read one headline;174 "Pataki Asks
Greater Rent Protection," read a second. 75 Newsday's article
characterized his plan as a "middle-ground proposal. ' 176 Only one
initial story got to the heart of the proposal. The lead in the Daily
News read, "Gov. Pataki yesterday proposed wiping out rent pro-
tections when tenants vacate their apartments. ' 177 In contrast, the
Post's headline read "Pataki's Plan Seeks Perpetual Protection. ' '117
The lead in the Post the next day said that the Governor's proposal
would spell "a slow but certain death for the city's rent-regulation
system. "179
Vacancy decontrol was indeed at the heart of the Governor's
proposal, but he spent significant energy trying to disguise both the
existence of that proposal and its consequences. One stratagem
was to release other parts of his proposal first, so that they would
be the center of public attention. On May 11th, he proposed an
expansion of luxury decontrol, seeking to reduce the income ceil-
ing at which high-rent decontrol would kick in from $250,000 to
$175,000, and get rid of the requirement that the apartment be
renting for $2,000 per month or more for decontrol to apply.180
Only on the next day, May 12th, did he release the rest of his plan,
which included vacancy decontrol. In doing so, he literally refused
172. James Dao, Pataki Urges End of Rent Cap When Apartment Is Vacated, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 1997, at Al.
173. Raymond Hernandez, Entering Debate, Governor Offers Rent Compromise,
N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1997, at Al.
174. Pataki's Rent Control Plan Seeks Middle Ground, TIMES UNION (Albany),
May 13, 1997, at A4.
175. Joel Stashenko, Pataki Asks Greater Rent Protection, TIMES UNION (Albany),
May 12, 1997, at B2.
176. Ellen Yan, Rent Remedy? Pataki Seeks Phaseout of Rules for Most; Plan
Draws Fire on All Sides, NEWSDAY, May 13, 1997, at A3.
177. Jon R. Sorensen & Michael Finnegan, Pataki's Idea of Control Gov Says Let
Moving, Death End Hike Limits, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 13, 1997, at 5.
178. Gregg Birnbaum & Frederic U. Dicker, New Lease on Life for Rent Laws:
Pataki's Plan Seeks Perpetual Protection, N.Y. POST, May 12, 1997, at 6.
179. Gregg Birnbaum & Tom Topousis, Pataki Bids for Slow Decontrol: His Apt.-
Vacancy Plan Would End Rules Over Time, N.Y. POST, May 13, 1997, at 2. The Post's
editorial writers must not have read the article, for they wrote on the same day that
the Pataki position "stakes out a middle ground." See Editorial, The Pataki Rent
Plan, N.Y. PosT, May 13, 1997, at 24.
180. See Hernandez, supra note 173.
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to utter the phrase "vacancy decontrol" even once. 181 This refusal,
which continued through the balance of the rent regulation de-
bate,182 was part of a second strategy: to substitute for "vacancy
decontrol," a phrase well understood (both by supporters and op-
ponents) to mean a removal of protections from tenants,183 a very
different description of the Governor's desire for tenant protec-
tion. "My plan to save rent control," said Governor Pataki, "will
ensure that every middle-class tenant has the right to remain in
their apartment for the rest of their lives if they choose, protecting
rent laws for about 99 percent of New York tenants. ' 184 The theme
that he was providing lifetime rent protection for "99 percent of
New York tenants"'18 5 became an incantation to which the Gover-
nor clung to steadfastly through the rest of the rent regulation
debate.
The Governor's vacancy decontrol plan immediately won wide
editorial endorsement. The Albany Times Union said the Gover-
nor had proposed a "worthy plan," and noted that he looked "very
much like a moderate in contrast to Mr. Bruno.' 1 86 Newsday de-
scribed the plan as a compromise that was both "pragmatic" and "a
good start.1187 The Times said that the plan was a "reasonable
compromise,"""' an intriguing description not because it was out of
keeping with the original goal of both the Governor and The Times
to end regulation through enactment of vacancy decontrol, but be-
cause the same editorial frankly acknowledged that, "The landlords
have been known all along to be ready to settle for 'vacancy
decontrol.' ",189
3. The Purpose of Vacancy Decontrol
The most cogent and straightforward explanation for why va-
cancy decontrol was so appealing to landlords came from Crain's
New York Business. "In a reasonably short space of time," Crain's
wrote, vacancy decontrol would "move hundreds of thousands of
181. See Sorensen & Finnegan, supra note 177; Yan, supra note 176.
182. See Richard P6rez-Pefia, The Rent Battle: The Impact; Although Meant to Cre-
ate Fluidity, Decontrol Could Freeze the Market, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1997, at B4.
183. See Hernandez, supra note 173.
184. See id.
185. Id.
186. Editorial, A Worthy Rent Control Plan, TIMES UNION (Albany), May 14, 1997,
at A10.
187. Editorial, Pataki's Rent Control Compromise A Good Start, NEWSDAY, May
13, 1997, at A36.
188. Editorial, A Way to Compromise on Rents, supra note 30.
189. Id.
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units to the free market."19° Crain's confidence about the number
of apartments likely to be quickly deregulated was based on New
York's previous experiment with vacancy decontrol, an experiment
in which some 400,000 apartments wound up being deregulated in
just a period of three years.191 But Crain's made clear that it was
not simply the direct effect of deregulating so many apartments
that was so desirable about Governor Pataki's vacancy decontrol
plan. By deregulating those apartments, another strategic goal
would be achieved at the same time: vacancy decontrol would
"help undermine the political support for rent regulations. "192
The importance of the political dimension spoken to by Crain's
cannot be overestimated. The strategy of trying to end government
benefits or regulations through a multi-step process is, after all, not
unique to rent regulation. The problem faced by rent regulation
opponents, and their proposed solution, has actually been mirrored
quite closely, for example, in the debate over the future of the so-
cial security system. When the benefits of a program are spread
widely, opponents find that killing the program directly is difficult
or impossible. Instead, the goal is to reduce the constituency that is
directly aided by the program so that ultimately the program is
seen as a "special interest" program, especially one that is only
helping poorer citizens, and political opposition to killing the pro-
gram outright becomes splintered and significantly less potent.193
In the Social Security context, the means by which to narrow sup-
port for the program is seen to be privatization; in the rent regula-
tion context, vacancy decontrol is an important step on the same
road. And, as Crain's pointed out in its editorial seeking to rally
business support for the Pataki plan, expansion of luxury decon-
trol, another element of that plan, had the same political utility.
The lowering of the income threshold for luxury decontrol was
most important for being "the first step toward revamping the sys-
tem into an income-based program."'194
190. Editorial, Viewpoint: Pataki's Rent Effort Merits Biz Support, CRAIN'S N.Y.
Bus., May 19, 1997, at 8 [hereinafter Editorial, Biz Support].
191. See infra text accompanying notes 234-238; see also W. Dennis Keating, Rent
Regulation in New York City: A Protracted Saga, in RENT CONTROL: REGULATION
AND THE RENTAL HOUSING MARKET 151, 160 (W. Dennis Keating et al. eds., 1998).
192. Editorial, Biz Support, supra note 190.
193. See ROBERT KUTTNER, THE ECONOMIC ILLUSION: FALSE CHOICES BETWEEN
PROSPERITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 40-41 (1984) ("To win broad popular support, so-
cial programs must be of high quality and must serve the middle class as well as the
poor").
194. Id.
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Once Governor Pataki's vacancy control plan was on the table,
Assembly Speaker Silver immediately said he would not permit to
pass containing such a provision to pass his house of the legisla-
ture;195 Senate Majority Leader Bruno immediately said he would
not permit a bill that did not contain a vacancy control provision to
pass his chamber. 196 "The two leaders' comments underscore[d]
what tenant groups have been saying for weeks: that vacancy de-
control will be the major battle ground" fought over until a final
resolution is achieved. 197
Within two weeks, the Rent Stabilization Association had joined
the issue, beginning an advertising campaign that said that, "The
Pataki plan protects 99 percent of all tenants from losing their rent-
controlled apartments.' ' 198 In early June, Governor Pataki mailed
a. leaflet to millions of renters in New York State (at state expense)
with the headline "Governor Pataki's Plan Will Protect New York
Renters." 199 The mailing never mentioned vacancy decontrol, say-
ing that only "a few millionaires" would be deregulated, and that
all tenants but the "wealthiest few who earn more than $175,000 a
year will have the right to remain in their apartments for the rest of
their lives." 200
Michael McKee, the rent law campaign manager for Tenants &
Neighbors, the state's largest tenants' group,201 described the leaf-
let as "absolutely Orwellian, '20 2 a characterization appropriately
applied to the entire "99 percent protection" charade. It was one
thing to argue about the extent to which tenants would be harassed
in an attempt to cause them to vacate their apartments.0 3 The ex-
tent to which rents would increase when individual apartments
were subjected to vacancy decontrol was also a point of dispute.20 4
But there was simply no question that the purpose of vacancy de-
control was to end rent regulation entirely. Whether it would take
195. See James Dao, Bruno Makes Concessions on Rent Rule, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
1997, at B1.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See Richard P6rez-Pefia, Landlords Take Their Case, and Pataki's, to the Ra-
dio, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1997, at B3.
199. See Richard Prez-Pefia, Pataki Sends Fliers Touting His Rent Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, June 8, 1997, § 1, at 41.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See infra Part I.J. accompanying notes 234-248.
204. See infra Part .1 accompanying notes 205-233.
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decades, like Governor Pataki sometimes claimed 205 and Peter
Salins seconded, 0 6 or fourteen years, as a Daily News analysis sug-
gested,20 7 could be debated. Whether the 125,000 units deregu-
lated per year under New York's 1971-74 vacancy decontrol
experience (the rate on which Crain's was counting)20 8 would be
the rate that obtained could not be known for certain. Whether
the effective end of regulation would come long before the last
apartment was officially deregulated was less subject to question
both because of the many apartments that already rented at mar-
ket levels and because the political clout of pro-regulation forces
would quickly dwindle. In any event, ending rent regulation en-
tirely-the innocuous sounding "orderly transition to a free mar-
ket" that Governor Pataki had long advocated 209-was the
ultimate goal.
The conceit of the Governor's "99 percent protection" formula-
tion was that rent regulation in one's existing apartment was any-
thing similar to an ongoing system of rent regulation. What would
happen, for example, if one needed to move from the Bronx to
Brooklyn to be able to take a new job? What if an elderly parent
needed to move in with his grown child, and that family needed to
find a larger apartment? What if a young couple were having a
baby and wanted to move from a one-bedroom to a two-bedroom
apartment? All would be out of luck. As Daily News columnist
Jim Dwyer described the workings of the "99% protection" plan,
"The way it works is this: You can have your rent-regulated apart-
ment forever. But if you move, you will never get another one.
You are now living in the last rent-regulated apartment of your
life."' 210 Strange as it may sound, it appears that the Governor was
confronted by the press on this point only once. He was entirely
unresponsive: "When asked [during the second week of June] if his
plan might pose a problem for anyone who needed to move, the
Governor said, 'I'm not going to talk about everybody, the possible
205. See Sorensen & Finnegan, supra note 177 ("Pataki contended his plan would
keep regulations in effect for decades").
206. Salins, supra note 34, at 64.
207. See Kimberly Schaye, Bruno Bends Decontrol Deadline, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
May 17, 1997, at 3.
208. See supra notes 190-194 and accompanying text.
209. See Michael Finnegan, Dem Ads Rip Pataki, D'Amato on Rents, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Apr. 28, 1997, at 29.
210. Jim Dwyer, Rail Story is Lost: Public Paved Way, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 13,
1997, at 4.
372
2004] DISMANTLING RENT REGULATION IN N.Y. 373
thoughts of every individual,' and quickly turned to another
question. "211
Separate from the truth-in-advertising problem, vacancy decon-
trol presented four main issues. Two of these-potential rent in-
creases and potential harassment-were discussed extensively.
Two others-the issue of security of tenure and the question of the
underlying plausibility of a truly competitive market-based rental
market (the ostensible goal of vacancy decontrol)-were discussed
little or at all.
I. What Would Happen to Rents?
The issue of the scope of rent increases had already become a
touchstone for argument with the release of the de Seve report in
March. In mid-May, researchers released details from a forthcom-
ing report, this one commissioned by New York City's Rent Guide-
lines Board and by the Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy at
N.Y.U. Law School ("RGB Study").2 12 Like the de Seve study,213
the RGB study predicted that vacancy decontrol would cause large
increases in rent for several neighborhoods in Manhattan (for ex-
ample, an average of twenty-three percent in Chelsea, Clinton, and
Midtown), and smaller rent increases in outer borough locations
(for example, average increases of seven percent in several neigh-
borhoods of Southern Brooklyn).2 14 Increases over the long-term
were expected to be even steeper.215
While many anti-regulation advocates were happy enough to fo-
cus on the smaller increases projected for the outer boroughs, some
took the view that rents would actually ultimately decline with the
end of regulation. William Tucker's study for the Cato Institute
argued that housing was more affordable in cities that did not have
rent regulation.21 6 He examined advertisements for apartments
that were placed on a single Sunday in April 1997 in newspapers in
eighteen major cities.2 17 According to Tucker, "The most striking
211. See Pdrez-Pefia, supra note 182.
212. EDGAR 0. OLSEN, THE IMPACT OF VACANCY DECONTROL IN NEW YORK
CITY: THE FIRST ESTIMATES FROM THE 1996 HOUSING AND VACANCY SURVEY
(1997), available at http://www.housingnyc.com/research/html-reports/olsen.html (last
visited Nov. 9, 2003).
213. See supra notes 148-150.
214. See Dennis Hevesi, Rent Decontrol Study: From No Impact to 30% Increases,
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1997, at B1.
215. See id.
216. See TUCKER, supra note 59, at 6.
217. See id. at 14.
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observation is that the graphs of rents in free-market cities follow a
standard bell curve. The vast majority of advertised rents cluster
around the median [based on the 1990 U.S. Census], with between
33 and 40 percent below the census median. The median adver-
tised rent is rarely more than $50 above the census median. 218
In contrast, in regulated New York and regulated San Francisco,
the median advertised rents were "more than double the census
median," and fewer than "10 percent of advertised rents were be-
low the census median. ' 219 His conclusion: "Rent control in both
these cities appears to make housing spectacularly unafford-
able. 220
In some ways it is difficult to take the Tucker study seriously, as
he altogether failed to take into account the skewing effect of look-
ing only at apartments that are advertised. Affordable apart-
ments-that is to say, rent regulated apartments-are the least
likely to be advertised, as landlords have no difficulty in renting
any but the least desirable of them. The census data Tucker him-
self relied on show this: for only 10 percent of the advertised rents
to be below the census median, a substantially disproportionate
percentage of the apartments not advertised had to be the ones
below the census median that were either being lived in by New
Yorkers, or the ones that could be rented without advertising.221 In
addition to the sampling error, he failed to take into account differ-
ences between and among cities in respect to the earning power of
the wealthiest tier of potential renters or the size of that tier, let
alone variables that have an impact on cost such as the extent of
available land.
Nevertheless, the argument underlying Tucker's show-and-tell
was an important one for rent regulation opponents. The thesis
was that the existence of a regulated sector of the market creates a
"shadow market"-that is, the portion of the market that is unreg-
ulated.222 "Because prices are pushed too low in the regulated sec-
tor, they are forced above what would otherwise be the market
price in the unregulated sector. '223 Tucker apparently presumed
that, with controls removed, a single unregulated market would ad-
just to create prices that were not too high, not too low, but just
218. See id. at 15.
219. Id. at 16.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 17 ("regulated apartments are essentially withdrawn from the mar-
ket"). For a discussion of Tucker's methodology, see id. at 16.
222. See id. at 6.
223. Id.
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right.224 But just right for whom? Michael Schill, the professor at
N.Y.U. who released the RGB Study, conceded that vacancy de-
control would most likely "lead to a decrease in housing opportuni-
ties for low-and moderate-income households. ' 225  That is,
landlords, given the chance, would raise rents in desirable neigh-
borhoods forcing some people out.226 At the higher end of the
market, there might be fewer people chasing more available apart-
ments. "But the less-affluent would compete with lower-income
residents for affordable housing ... making rents rise" at the lower
end of the market.227
The least likely scenario would be that a market concerned, by
definition, with maximizing profit would ever produce affordable
housing. Though some anti-regulation opponents claimed that, in
time, affordable housing would "filter down to all segments of the
population, '228 there was no evidence to suggest that this theory
operated in practice. "If deregulated markets work the way the
supply-siders argue," responded one opponent of deregulation,
"then why do we have such terrible slums in cities like Houston
and Miami? That's where filtering should have worked, by now.
They've never had regulation. '229 Crain's reported that, even
before any imposition of vacancy decontrol, a ripple effect was be-
ing demonstrated: the tight Manhattan market was already driving
renters to the outer boroughs, with the result that previously "mar-
ginal" areas had become more popular, and rents in several desira-
ble outer borough neighborhoods had jumped 20 percent in a
year's time.23°
Anecdotal evidence may have had as much an impact on public
opinion as anything else. At the end of April, the Daily News re-
ported "an upper West Side landlord mistakenly jumped the gun
on the threatened expiration of state rent laws, trying to slam one
tenant with a staggering 337% hike. '23 1 Explaining why he wanted
to charge his tenant $4,000 a month for a 375-square foot, one-
224. See id. at 19.
225. See Randy Kennedy, Steepest Hikes are Expected Chiefly in Parts of Manhat-
tan, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1997, at B4.
226. See id.
227. See Ellen Yan, et al, Will Rent Regulation Change the Face of Queens?, NEWS-
DAY, May 19, 1997, at A23.
228. See Hevesi, supra note 157.
229. See id. (quoting "one deregulation opponent, W. Dennis Keating").
230. See Emily Denitto, Manhattan Exodus: Boroughs Lure Renters With Space,
Price, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., May 19, 1997, at 1.
231. See Kimberly Schaye, 337% Rent Hike Tried by Landlord, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
Apr. 29, 1997, at 6.
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bedroom apartment, the landlord said: "He's got a very spacious
garden apartment, which is highly desirable. '232 Prudently, land-
lord groups asked their members to refrain from such conduct
while the debate was pending, fearing that more "horror stories"
would harm their cause.233
J. How Much of a Threat was Landlord Harassment?
On the issue of whether vacancy decontrol would give landlords
an incentive to harass their tenants so that the tenants would leave
and the landlords could raise rents quickly and substantially, anti-
regulation forces began and remained on the defensive. In part,
this was because there had been prior experience with vacancy de-
control (from 1971 to 1974).234 The experiment with vacancy de-
control was ended because tenant advocates had successfully
argued that there had been "enormous rent increases in decontrol-
led units . . without improved maintenance; they also cited wide-
spread illegal landlord harassment of tenants to force vacancies. "235
At the time, a report by then-Assemblyman Andrew Stein had
found that decontrol had caused rents to skyrocket, "but had
'neither stimulated new building construction' nor 'spurred renova-
tion."' 236 Even more threatening, the District Attorneys of Brook-
lyn, Queens, and Manhattan had, by the end of the 1997 debate,
banded together to warn of the dangers of landlord harassment.237
The Manhattan District Attorney,
who prosecuted dozens of cases during the tight real estate mar-
ket in the early 80s in which landlords hired professional 'vacat-
ers' to force tenants out, said vacancy decontrol would provide
an irresistible opening for some landlords. 'We are concerned
that if you give corrupt landlords an incentive to get people out
because of decontrol, they will go back to the professional goon
squads. '238
232. See id.
233. See Philip Lentz, Landlords Urged to Remain Cool if Controls End: Industry
Fears Big Rent Increases, Evictions Would Harm Rent Battle, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., June
9, 1997, at 1.
234. See Keating, supra note 191, at 160.
235. See id. at 160.
236. See Elizabeth Kolbert, The Rent Debate: The Overview: Studies Suggest Te-
nants in Upscale Neighborhoods Would Be Hit the Hardest, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1997,
§ 1, at 38.
237. See Randy Kennedy, Rent-Law Plan is Criticized by Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES,
June 6, 1997, at B1 [hereinafter Kennedy, Criticized by Prosecutors].
238. See id.
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One tactic for anti-regulation forces was to deny that harassment
would be a problem. The Rent Stabilization Association claimed
that the 1974 Stein Commission "reached conclusions based on a
political agenda, and not on the facts. ' 239 The president of the
Real Estate Board said, "The accusations [by the District Attor-
neys] about harassment are just not true," pointing out that harass-
ment complaints dropped during the period during which vacancy
decontrol had been in effect.24 ° But the anti-regulation side was
clearly worried on this issue. After all, even as ardent an anti-regu-
lation advocate as William Tucker opposed the vacancy decontrol
route to deregulation (preferring the elimination of all regulation
in a single stroke) in part because of the threat of harassment.24 a
Tucker wrote that "individual landlords [would] have every incen-
tive to evict their regulated tenants since vacancy means deregula-
tion of the apartment. ' 242 Tucker was concerned that pressure
would grow for the reimposition of regulation because of "a daily
series of horror stories, with landlords doing everything from hiring
thugs to setting fire to their buildings to get rid of low-rent te-
nants. '24 3 (Walter Block and his co-authors also opposed the tech-
nique of vacancy decontrol, but only because "it worked too
slowly. ,)244
Indeed, when the June 15th deadline approached, and it seemed
possible that regulation might expire, New York City's largest land-
lord group issued a call for their members to act responsibly, a call
reflecting "their own apprehensions that some of their peers might
use the expiration of the laws as an opportunity to immediately
evict tenants or raise rents dramatically-actions that could cause
panic and damage the efforts of their allies, State Senate Republi-
cans, to craft legislation that would phase out rent laws. ' 24 5 Gover-
nor Pataki, recognizing the threat that the fear of harassment
represented to his plan for vacancy decontrol, had included in his
plan a proposal to increase both civil and criminal penalties for
landlords found to have engaged in harassment of tenants.246 But
239. See Kolbert, supra note 236.
240. See Randy Kennedy, The Rent Battle: The Landlords; Act Honorably, Worried
Owners Urge Their Peers, N.Y. TIMES, June 11., 1997, at B5 [hereinafter Kennedy, The
Rent Battle].
241. See TUCKER, supra note 59, at 19.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. Block et al., supra note 46, at 257.
245. See Kennedy, The Rent Battle, supra note 240.
246. See Dao, supra note 172.
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pro-regulation forces, who had asserted that the decline in com-
plaints during the previous experiment with vacancy decontrol was
simply a function of the fact that tenants thought it futile to com-
plain, questioned whether there would be real enforcement of the
law.247 Asked by a reporter on June 2nd about the resources that
would be devoted to prosecution, "the Governor declined to say
how much money he would pledge to create a special office or to
help district attorneys. 'Let's pass the law first,' Mr. Pataki said.
2 48
K. Security of Tenure
The debate about the costs and benefits of abolishing rent regu-
lation typically did not include a discussion of the fact that rent
regulation provided tenants with security of tenure.249 This could
well have been caused in significant part by widespread blindness
to values other than that of the market.2 5 0 The absence of discus-
sion was striking, though, as Richard Arnott, writing in the Journal
of Economics Perspectives, pointed out in a footnote:
While not mentioned often in the economics literature on rent
control, the issue of security of tenure is of considerable impor-
tance in the policy debate. Partly because of the cost of moving,
but more importantly because of the value of having a secure
and familiar home, many renters attach great importance to pro-
tection against eviction. Eviction may occur not only due to an-
tisocial behavior or nonpayment of rent... One effect of rent
control is to convert short-term leases into quasi-long-term
leases. The control of rent restricts economic eviction. And the
changes in landlord-tenant law that almost always accompany
the imposition of rent control make (noneconomic) eviction
more difficult.251
In New York, the law had given rent stabilized tenants the ongoing
right to continue their tenancies in one- or two-year increments (as
the tenant desired), for as long as they liked (and for as long as
they continued to pay the rent and abide by rules relating to tenant
conduct).252 It is not difficult to imagine the principal reasons why
this feature of rent regulation would be something that regulation
opponents ignored to extent they could get away with doing so.
247. See id.
248. See Kennedy, Criticized by Prosecutors, supra note 237.
249. See Richard Arnott, Time for Revisionism on Rent Control? 9 J. OF ECON.
PERSPS. 99, 108 n.17 (1995).
250. See infra text accompanying notes 274-276.
251. See Arnott, supra note 249, at 108 n.17.
252. See RSL § 26-511(c)(4) (1969).
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To have raised the question of security of tenure would have
been to risk exposing the power dynamics that underlay the rela-
tions between landlords and tenants, and the profound changes to
those dynamics that vacancy decontrol would bring about. In con-
trast to all rent-regulated tenants, no tenant who came to live in an
apartment that had been decontrolled would be able to enjoy "the
value of a secure and familiar home. '253 Independent of the ques-
tion of how much rent a landlord might want to charge, a landlord
of unregulated apartments wields substantially more power in rela-
tion to that landlord's tenants than does a landlord of regulated
apartments. Such a landlord-as was the case in 1997 and as re-
mains the case today-is under no obligation to offer a tenant a
written lease,254 let alone offer a lease of a particular duration, let
alone offer a renewal lease if the tenant wanted one.255 The land-
lord would be able to refuse to renew a tenant's lease for any rea-
son or no reason, whether that tenant had lived in an apartment for
two years or twenty years. 6
The shift in the balance of power that deregulation would bring
would resonate first and foremost in terms of the extent to which
tenants would or would not be able to regard their apartments as
their homes. The ideal of home ownership is deeply ingrained in
the American narrative as a foundation of personal indepen-
dence-both economic and political-and as a foundation of self-
identity and relation to community. 7 The fact that Americans, at
the same time, have moved frequently is not inconsistent with the
idea that home ownership places an individual in charge of his own
253. See Arnott, supra note 249.
254. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (2003) (establishing a warrantee of habi-
tiablity for every "written or oral" residential lease); OFF. OF THE N.Y. STATE ATT'Y
GEN., TENANT'S RIGHTS GUIDE (1999) ("Leases for apartments which are not rent
stabilized may be oral or written."), available at http://www.housingnyc.com/re-
sources/attygenguide.html. (last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
255. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 232-a (1989).
256. It is true the prohibitions on discriminatory conduct (e.g., discrimination on
the basis of race or national origin) would not be overturned. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 296(5)(a) (2003). Because there would be in an unregulated environment no enti-
tlement to ongoing lease renewals, however, the remedy for discriminatory conduct
would be much more limited than under rent regulation. It is unlikely that a court
would order a landlord to provide ongoing lease renewals, so that even a discrimi-
nated against tenant would only obtain temporary relief.
257. See CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE: SOCIAL ORDER AND
LAND USE IN AMERICA 78 (1977) ("'Homeownership provides a sense of identity, of
roots and of security, which is the stuff from which neighborhoods are made and
which protect against social alienation." (quoting then-Sect'y of Hous. and Urb.
Devel. Carla Hills, Remarks Before the American Bar Association (Aug. 13, 1975))).
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destiny (i.e., he can move or not as he wills). There is no reason to
believe that New Yorkers would be any less interested in being in
charge of their own destinies than other Americans, yet deregula-
tion means at root that the tenant is moved or not as his landlord
wills.
The importance of security of tenure, as represented by the right
to renew one's lease, has occasionally been acknowledged even by
regulation opponents. As George Fallis, one such opponent, wrote
in Rent Control: The Citizen, The Market, and the State, any assess-
ment of why rent regulation exists ought to recognize the fact that
"housing is a necessity and involves issues of fairness. "258 He re-
ported on empirical evidence gathered in the 1980s about people's
attitudes regarding fair housing and wrote that, "It is clear that the
community regards the relationship between landlord and tenant
to be different than that between the leasor and leasee of other
goods or between the seller and buyer of other goods. ' 259 Specifi-
cally, refusing to renew a lease, except in extraordinary circum-
stances, was seen as unfair, violative of a perceived right to almost
indefinite tenancy.26 °
Having their position seen as posing a threat to "the value of
having a secure and familiar home" could hardly help the market
populist bona fides of regulation opponents. As such, the primary
public response was to deny that the threat existed. As we have
seen, Governor Pataki focused on claiming that tenants could re-
main in an existing rent-regulated apartment for the rest of their
lives. He did not discuss what would happen to them once they
had to move to an unregulated apartment. Another way to deny
that deregulation would dramatically shift the balance of power de-
cisively towards landlords was to lean on what might be called the
fiction of equality of power at the moment of contract. The Com-
munity Housing Improvement Program ("CHIP") was and is an
anti-regulation trade association of apartment building owners in
New York City.26' CHIP published a booklet in 1997 to try to in-
258. George Fallis, Rent Controlb The Citizen, The Market, and The State, 1 J. OF
REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 309, 311 (1988).
259. Id. at 313 (citing J. KNETSCH ET AL., RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES: LOSSES, FAIR-
NESS AND REGULATIONS 1984).
260. Id. (citing KNETSCH ET AL., supra note 259).
261. See Press Release, Cmty. Hous. Improvement Program, About CHIP (un-
dated) ("Since 1966, Community Housing Improvement Program has served as the
eyes and ears of New York City apartment building owners .... CHIP's mission has
remained unchallenged throughout 40 years of leadership-to challenge rent regula-
tions and help apartment owners survive in New York City."), available at http://
www.chipnyc.org/about.shtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2003).
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fluence the public debate over whether to continue rent regula-
tion.262  Posing the rhetorical question, "Will Ending Rent
Regulation Result in More Evictions?" and answering, "No,"
CHIP presented its view of how a free market works:
The issue of eviction is widely misunderstood. In a free market,
leases are contracts with fixed terms, typically one or two years.
At the end of the lease, either the building owner or renter may
decide to renew, or not. If they both want to renew the lease,
they negotiate terms. Most leases that tenants wish to renew are
renewed. The tenant and owner come to terms because the ten-
ant is a known quantity to the owner and in place. Finding a new
tenant, and preparing an apartment for re-occupancy by a stran-
ger costs the owner time and money and entails risk. Similarly,
the apartment is a known quantity to a tenant. Occasionally,
however, an owner will refuse to renew a lease because he
knows the tenant to be unable to pay the rent; or someone who
annoys other tenants; or vandalizes the property. The refusal to
renew, or the inability to come to terms with a tenant, is not an
eviction.263
In the world that CHIP wanted its readers to believe existed,
landlords and tenants could negotiate as equals. The inconve-
nience to a landlord of having to find a new tenant was equivalent
to the inconvenience of the tenant having to find a new home.
Only rarely the two parties would fail to come to terms; indeed,
only where the tenant was sufficiently "bad" to outweigh the costs
to the landlord of finding a new tenant. Leaving aside for the mo-
ment the question 6f whether a truly "free" market (i.e., an actu-
ally competitive one) exists or could exist in New York, one is still
left with the question of whether anything other than the illustra-
tions given makes a bad tenant to whom an owner will not offer
continued occupancy. The most obvious tenant characteristic that
CHIP, not coincidentally, left out is the trait of being demanding of
services and repairs. In the regulated environment, tenants can
seek such services and repairs knowing that they are entitled to
continued tenure. They can withhold rent for a landlord's failure
to maintain the warranty of habitability.2" They can petition the
262. See DAN MARGULIES, CMTY. Hous. IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM, OUT OF CON-
TROL: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RENT REGULATION IN NEW YORK CITY 14 (2d
ed. 2002), available at http://chipnyc.org/outofcontrol.shtml (last visted Oct. 1, 2003).
The guide was originally published during the debate in 1997.
263. Id. at 14.
264. See N.Y. REAL PROP LAW § 235-b (2003); see also Park W. Mgt. Corp. v.
Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d 316, 329 (1979).
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New York State Department of Housing and Community Renewal
for a reduction in rent when services are reduced (a mechanism
available pursuant to the Rent Stabilization Code).265 In the "free
market," on the other hand, tenants would know that instead of the
squeaky wheel getting the grease, the squeaky wheel would be
shown the door as soon as the existing lease term expired. Land-
lords would have every incentive to get rid of any tenant who was
not docile; only the most desperate or foolhardy tenant would dare
complain.
If this scenario sounds like the situation that obtained in a com-
pany town, the rhetoric of less politically cautious opponents of
rent regulation make clear that creating the rental housing analog
to a company town would be desirable and appropriate. Walter
Block and his colleagues, the authors of Rent Control: An Eco-
nomic Abomination, believe that property owners should be able
to exercise their property rights fully, but that rent regulation co-
erces those owners into relinquishing many of these rights.2 66
Block and his supporters use an analogy to the area of labor-man-
agement relations:
According to much labor law, and judicial findings, it is required
of the employer that he "bargain fairly" with the employees.
This holds even if his desire is not to bargain at all, but rather to
fire them all. On the other hand, no such requirement is im-
posed on the workers. They are free to quit, even all together,
at any time.267
A fair balance of power, apparently, would be. the situation where
the employer is "free" to seek, for example, to pay workers less
than a minimum wage, and where the employees would be "free"
either to accept the proposal or to go without work. Likewise, a
fair balance of power in the landlord-tenant realm would be one
where the landlord would be free to seek any rent, and the tenant
would be free either to pay it or to go without a home. Rent regu-
lation represents such a pernicious interference with the natural
and normal order of things that Block and his co-authors describe
such regulation as "akin to an infectious disease. '2 68
Interestingly, the use of a disease metaphor was not limited to a
single article. An article in the Small Property Owner, focusing on
landlords who are women, claimed that "women reel" under the
265. Rent Stabilization Code, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2523.4 (2003).
266. Block et al., supra note 46, at 258.
267. Id. at 261 n.12.
268. Id. at 260.
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restraints of rent regulation. Indeed, "The toll in stress-related ill-
ness is incalculable. 2 69 William Tucker looked at a broader socie-
tal landscape, but described it in equally apocalyptic terms:
Rent control is a disease of the mind that soon becomes a dis-
ease of the market. Those cities that resist infection-merely by
having a healthy tolerance for the rights of others-are re-
warded with a normal competitive housing market in which
housing is available at every price level. Those cities that suc-
cumb to the disease of rent control are doomed to never-ending,
house-to-house warfare over an ever-diminishing supply of
unaffordable housing.270
L. Could the Housing Market in New York City
Actually Be Competitive?
Underlying all the anti-regulation rhetoric was the belief that
when the disease of regulation has been conquered, the normal
state of the housing market will actually be competitive. As ad-
verted to earlier,271 it is the assumption that an unregulated market
is a competitive market (and that a competitive market works ben-
eficially) that gives the theological underpinnings to rent regulation
foes.
The opponents of rent regulation look at rental apartments with
the same supply-and-demand analysis as they would in respect to
any other commodity. As summarized by Tucker,
Consumers, of course, are inclined to buy more as prices fall and
less as prices rise. Sellers act in an opposite manner.... At one
point-and one point only-the interests of buyers and sellers
will intersect. This is the "market-clearing price," the point at
which, given current economic circumstances, the desires of
both groups are optimized.272
There can be temporary dislocations where either owners or
buyers achieve an advantage, but "lacking government interfer-
ence, the actions of buyers and sellers always push prices toward a
269. Adrian R. Tiemann, Rent Regulation and Gender Gaps, SMALL PROPERTY
OWNER, Jan. 1997 (American Association of Small Property Owners, Washington,
D.C.), available at http://www.nationalcenter.org/RentControl497.html (last visited
Nov. 11, 2003).
270. TUCKER, supra note 59, at 21.
271. See supra text accompanying note 165.
272. TUCKER, supra note 59, at 7.
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market-clearing level. '2 73 One can imagine this process working in
respect to a variety of consumer products. Depending on individ-
ual economic circumstance and personal preference, and on the
price, quality, and aesthetic appeal of various articles of clothing, a
consumer theoretically has a wide range of choices. If a particular
manufacturer is seen as producing dresses that are too expensive
for a particular consumer, that consumer can easily switch to prod-
ucts of a different manufacturer. As much as a consumer may wish
to trade in her old car for a new SUV, if she loses her job she will
continue to limp along with her old Chevy. If gasoline prices rise
significantly, she may decide (if she has not lost her job) that it
makes more sense to purchase a Honda Civic with a hybrid engine
that gets fifty miles-per-gallon instead of the SUV.
Despite the desire of rent regulation opponents to import this
analysis wholesale into their assessment of rental housing markets,
the applicability of such an analysis, and the associated assumption
of competitive rental markets, is highly questionable. Richard Ap-
pelbaum and John Gilderbloom looked into this issue extensively
in Supply-Side Economics and Rents: Are Rental Housing Markets
Truly Competitive?274 They made a number of important observa-
tions worth noting here, but none more important than the fact
that it is a mistake to treat rental housing as though it were just
another commodity.275 First and foremost, housing is a necessity.
Unlike, say, that new toaster-oven a consumer may be hankering
for, "[p]eople are limited in their ability to forego housing con-
sumption, and the demand for rental housing in particular in rela-
tively price inelastic. 276
Compare the relative ability of landlords to react to changes in
an unregulated market to the costs and consequences of tenants
doing so. In such a market, landlords typically "retain the right to
convert rental units to condominiums or nonresidential uses, to de-
molish units, to upgrade units out of the reach of low-income rent-
ers, to resell units at higher prices, to raise rents without restriction,
to restrict rental arbitrarily to particular categories of tenants, and
273. Id. The push toward a market-clearing price is what Anthony Downs had re-
ferred to as the signaling process whereby rises in rents call forth changes in resource
allocations. See DowNs, supra note 63, at 23-24.
274. Richard G. Appelbaum & John I. Gilderbloom, Supply-Side Economics and
Rents: Are Rental Housing Markets Truly Competitive?, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON HOUsING 165 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 1986).
275. See generally id. at 167-72 (discussing why housing does not meet the seven
"frequently cited" criteria of market-competitive commodities.)
276. See id. at 171.
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to evict without just cause. ' 2 7 7 For tenants to be able to match the
bargaining power of such landlords, they would need to be able to
move freely. But, in fact, "[c]onsumers of rental housing face
many barriers to mobility. 27 8 Even leaving aside the barriers cre-
ated by residential segregation (effectively limiting neighborhoods
of choice for both minority and for white tenants), 279 moving has
many attendant costs. There is, first of all, the direct cost of the
move. But this cost pales in comparison to the other costs in-
volved. To move to a different neighborhood or region implies the
ability to find a job in the new locale along with the inclination to
embark on such a search.
As important, moving imposes non-economic costs. As most
housing economists seem not to want to understand, "Housing is
not a homogeneous commodity, in which all units are equivalent
substitutes. A house is unique because of its amenities, size, archi-
tecture, age, quality, neighborhood, as well as its location within a
neighborhood. '28 0 This means that the supply of housing available
at any one time that meets the needs and desires of a tenant is but
a fraction of the overall supply. A tenant is thus put in the position
of having to bargain in a climate of limited supply, or else agree to
give up a whole range of features desirable to him. If the move
requires a tenant to abandon the neighborhood in which he has
lived, even greater potential consequence result: "broken social
ties, lost neighborhood attachments, and the uprooting of children
to different schools. '281 As a result of these imbalances in land-
lord-tenant power relations, "tenants have very little leverage in
the competitive determination of rents. 28 2
In addition to the imbalances already discussed, there are other
market factors that tend to maximize the bargaining power of land-
lords at the expense of tenants, if that power is not constrained by
regulation. For example, landlords are significantly more organ-
ized than are tenants, giving rise to collusion in the setting of rents.
"To the degree that ownership is concentrated," wrote Appelbaum
and Gilderbloom, "this may be accomplished directly by tacit or
277. See id. at 170.
278. See id. at 169.
279. See John A. Powell, The Tensions Between Integration And School Reform, 28
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 655, 691-92 (2001) (noting that racial factors have been "in-
scribed into residential patterns," creating the false impression that people have free
choice over where to live and where to send their children to school).
280. See Appelbaum & Gilderbloom, supra note 274, at 172.
281. See id. at 170.
282. See id.
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even explicit agreement among the few individuals who dominate
the local housing market." '283 New York, of course, is a rental
housing market where ownership is significantly concentrated.2 84
Landlord trade associations facilitate and encourage this process.
The Institute of Real Estate Management of the National Associa-
tion of Realtors, for example, produced a pamphlet which urged
property managers to "act together," and advised them that, when
they raise rents: "[S]end a notice to your competition. It's the best
mail they'll get all day. Everyone is afraid to be the first to in-
crease rents. Once your competition sees you doing it, they'll very
likely follow suit, thus making the rent increase a fact of life for all
tenants."
285
Adding to the relative powerlessness of tenants is the fact that
each individual transaction is small relative to the universe of
transactions that make up the rental market. Hence, such a trans-
action has little or no impact on average rental prices (as distinct
from the situation that theoretically would obtain if a significant
proportion of available units were "negotiated in a single transac-
tion").286 Finally, though one of the crucial assumptions of market
economists is that a competitive market requires both producers
and consumers to "possess perfect knowledge of the market and
take advantage of every opportunity to increase profits and utility,
respectively, ' 287 tenants generally gather information less compre-
hensively than do their counterparts, and, in particular, rely on an
information source-newspaper advertisements-that can be very
much misleading:
It is likely that a heavy reliance on newspaper ads imparts an
upward bias to rentals,, since less expensive units are often
passed on by word of mouth. Most tenants therefore come to
believe that average rents are higher than they actually are and
are therefore willing to pay more in what becomes a self-fulfil-
ling expectation of high rents.288
Thus, despite the rhetoric of regulation opponents, it would ap-
pear as though the operation of an unregulated market would not
actually be competitive, and the choices that would be available to
tenants would be sub-optimal. Rent regulation opponents did not
283. Id. at 168.
284. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
285. See Appelbaum & Gilderbloom, supra note 274, at 168.
286. Id. at 167.
287. See id.
288. Id. at 170.
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allow this fundamental flaw in their underlying theory to lessen
their enthusiasm for deregulation. Indeed, what many seemed to
be saying was that an unfettered market was sufficiently important
to warrant the wholesale reallocation of costs to tenants. The need
to relocate, for example, is not seen as a hardship to tenants, but as
a positive social achievement. Peter Salins looked forward to the
unregulated environment in which,
The middle-income families and singles who now live in Man-
hattan's best neighborhoods at bargain rent would settle for
cheaper-and probably better-apartments in less fashionable
parts of the city; and the young couples who under rent regula-
tion now hang on to apartments poorly suited for raising fami-
lies would become homeowners.289
Similarly, William Tucker saw the fact that a tenant might live in
one apartment for a long time (even a lifetime) as representing
only "hoarding," a practice that deregulation would end.290
If tenants needed to double up, that too was acceptable to regu-
lation opponents. Charles de Seve described this very practice as a
positive illustration of the market principle that "demand is adjust-
able"; tenants who want "a higher quality or larger or better lo-
cated apartment than might be affordable pool their resources. "291
A consequence generally not discussed by regulation opponents is
what it means for there to be a market-clearing price "given cur-
rent economic circumstances." Since housing is a necessity, and
since some tenants will be unable or unwilling to relocate, they
would have to pay whatever the landlord demanded. This would
result in a higher percentage of their income going towards rent
(and, as de Seve himself acknowledged frankly and without the
slightest hint of regret, less disposable income available for other
purposes).292 For de Seve at least, this result was as it should be, a
function of free choices made by tenants.
Other factors that appeared not to enter into the analysis of reg-
ulation opponents were the social costs of the consequences of der-
289. Salins, supra note 34, at 64.
290. TUCKER, supra note 59, at 9.
291. DE SEVE, supra note 119, at 3.
292. Id. at 6. This phenomenon had already existed in respect to the poorest te-
nants in New York, the tenants who had the fewest options in terms of relocation.
According to the Housing NYC Rents, Markets and Trends '97, approximately 29.5
percent of renters in non-regulated apartments paid 40 percent or more of their in-
come on rent; approximately 32.4 percent of all renters (including those in regulated
housing and in public housing) paid 40 percent or more of their income on rent. See
MARKETS & TRENDS, supra note 23, at 102-03.
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egulation. Charles de Seve wrote that the large increase in average
rent that would ensue in "prime locations" such as "key areas of
Manhattan" was "as it should be as the market takes account of the
differential value of land throughout the City. '2 93 He did not ad-
dress the fact that such relocations would tend to heighten eco-
nomic and racial segregation by neighborhood. Likewise, the issue
of "social capital"-touched upon briefly in the March 1997 debate
in the State Assembly29 4-was not considered. In an unregulated
environment, tenants who pioneered living in undesirable or mar-
ginal neighborhoods would be welcomed. The efforts that they
made to improve those neighborhoods would be welcomed. As
those neighborhoods began to be perceived as more desirable,
however, their utility to their landlords would end. The landlords
would want to capture all of the increased value of apartments in
those neighborhoods, and many of the pioneers would be priced
out.
The acceptance of such consequences can only reasonably be ex-
plained by the view that the values of the market trumped all
others. A Newsday editorial illustrated its operative value system
particularly explicitly. "No, rent regulation isn't all bad," the paper
wrote. "It has worked to keep neighborhood populations stable
over time. And it does make life easier for long-time middle-class
residents. '295 Despite this, Newsday wanted rent regulation ended,
editorializing that restrictions on increases in rents cause shortages
and decline and represent "a flawed system that any Russian adult
would quickly recognize. ' '296 Keeping neighborhoods stable and
making life easier for the middle-class was ultimately not important
enough.
M. Countdown to Expiration
At the beginning of June 1997, only two weeks remained before
rent regulations were slated to expire. On one level, the lack of
resolution was not surprising. In Albany, one observer wrote, "it is
well known that nothing happens until everything happens and that
the last hour counts more than the first six months. ' 297 On another
level, the future of more than 2.5 million people was on the line;
293. DE SEVE, supra note 119, at 5.
294. NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY DEBATE TRANSCRIPTS 73-74 (Mar. 17, 1997)
(statement of Mr. Stringer).
295. See Editorial, This is Your City, supra note 49.
296. Id.
297. Elizabeth Kolbert, Avoidance and Obsession on Rent Laws, N.Y. TIMES, June
9, 1997, at Bi.
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many people were beginning to believe that, in fact, regulations
might actually be allowed to expire; and the level of tension contin-
ued to ratchet upward.
Pro- and anti-regulation groups took their messages to the air-
waves. 298 The New York State Tenants and Neighbors coalition
produced a television commercial which asserted: "The Pataki-
D'Amato decontrol plan means an end to rent protections. It is
the wrong answer. So tell Pataki and D'Amato to join the Assem-
bly Democrats and renew the rent protection laws now before the
clock runs out. ' 299 Down to the end, anti-regulation groups
avoided the phrase "vacancy decontrol," or any mention that the
point of the change in the law was to phase out rent regulation.
The Rent Stabilization Association produced a television commer-
cial asserting that:
Governor Pataki's rent control plan protects all seniors, disabled
and tenants making less than $175,000 a year. It's a good plan.
Sadly, Assembly Democrat Speaker Sheldon Silver is playing
politics with rent control. The Times says Silver is "playing a
dangerous game that could harm tenants." The Daily News says
when "rent control laws expire on June 15, renters will have
only Silver to blame. 30 0
This commercial illustrates just how important editorial support
was to the landlords' lobby. This support enabled the landlords to
shield their self-interest in having tenant protections removed with
what was apparently an independent, public-interest consensus
that regulation needed to be dismantled. And, in the days and
hours preceding the deadline, the editorialists did not give up. On
June 10th, Newsday said yet again, "Vacancy decontrol offers the
best hope of measured change .... Not only is this fair, it offers a
gradual shift to a free housing market.""3 1 On June 13th, The Times
described rent regulation as having "mutated into an entitlement
for individual renters that is a bureaucratic nightmare for small
landlords and does nothing to help create a supply of affordable
housing. "302 On June 15th, the Daily News, recalling the origins of
298. See Randy Kennedy, The Ad Campaign; Tenant Group's Scare Tactics About
Landlords' Scare Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1997, at B4 (providing the script for the
advertisement and analyzing its claims).
299. See id.
300. Randy Kennedy, The Rent Battle: The Ad Campaign; Landlords' Association
Tries to Turn the Spotlight on Silver, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1997, at 24.
301. Editorial, Renters Won't Forgive Albany for Decontrol Mess, NEWSDAY, June
10, 1997, at A40.
302. Editorial, A Generational Rent Gap, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1997, at A24.
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rent regulation during World War II, wrote that, "Nearly 54 years
later, there are no Reds and no Nazis, and the Dnieper flows
through an independent and democratic Ukraine. Rent control,
shamefully, still rules New York's roosts. ' 30 3
Countering these voices came support for the continuation of
regulation from a number of sources. Tenant organizations had al-
ready staged large pro-regulation rallies, including one that "at-
tracted thousands of angry tenants" to Albany. " Now the rallies
continued. At one, "[n]ot content with merely bringing their mes-
sage to his district, tenant advocates lined up yesterday in front of
the Maspeth home of Republican State Sen. Serphin Maltese, hop-
ing to tip the legislative scale in favor of continuing rent regula-
tion. '' 30 5 Greater attention also began to be paid to the idea that
vacancy decontrol might well have consequences beyond the pre-
cincts of Manhattan's well-to-do; that those forced out of Manhat-
tan would in turn cause rents to rise in middle-class outer-borough
neighborhoods such as Forest Hills, Brooklyn Heights, and
Riverdale.3 0 6 "[A]s they begin to contemplate the ripple effect in
their districts, legislators in the boroughs outside Manhattan have
become more concerned about the governor's plan, stiffening the
Assembly Democrats' resolve to maintain the current laws."3 7 As
for vacancy decontrol itself, a report in The Times pointed out:
No one would ever again find a vacant rent-stabilized apart-
ment, and that, renters say, is why the Pataki plan has evoked
such ire .... [It has dawned on many people that under vacancy
decontrol, they would have to choose between staying put and
taking their chances in an unregulated market.3 °8
Political warning clouds began to gather for anti-regulation
forces. As the deadline came closer, anti-regulation leaders were
being told, directly and indirectly, that their dream of the end of
rent regulation through vacancy decontrol might be too costly po-
litically to achieve in one legislative season. In early June, several
Republican State Senators from New York City and its surround-
303. Editorial, Rent Control's Memory Lane, N.Y. DAILY NEws, June 15, 1997, at
50.
304. Tenants Threaten 'Capitol' Punishment: Protesters warn gov he'll pay at the
polls, N.Y. POST, May 21, 1997, at 4.
305. See Robert Ratish & Dan Morrison, Takin it to the Streets/Groups Targeting
Sen. Maltese's Swing Vote, NEWSDAY, June 15, 1997, at A5.
306. See Boroughs Fear Exodus from Manhattan, TIMES UNION (Albany), June 1,
1997, at D7.
307. Id.
308. Pdrez-Pefia, supra note 182.
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ing suburbs told Senator Bruno that they would "suffer severe po-
litical damage" if the Majority Leader insisted on forcing a vacancy
decontrol bill through his house.30 9 A week later, The New York
Times published a public opinion poll showing that Governor
Pataki's approval rating had fallen ten percent in just three
months,310 data that the Governor had presumably already been
tracking through private polls. 31
The crisis atmosphere was such that, on June 11th, New York
City's Mayor Rudolph Giuliani announced the creation of hotlines
to provide tenants with information on their rights and, in the
event that regulations expired, to respond to incidents of landlord
harassment and other illegal landlord behavior.312 By the eve of
the expiration of the law, the hotline was receiving "as many as 100
calls an hour from tenants wondering what would happen to their
homes if the rent laws lapsed after [that night]. The anxious and
bewildered voices of many callers," wrote the reporter, "provided
telling evidence of the impact the prolonged dickering in Albany is
having on the lives of city residents. '313
Also on June 11th, Senator Bruno formally fell into line with
Governor Pataki on two issues. First, he agreed with the Gover-
nor's proposal to lower the threshold for "luxury decontrol" from
$250,000 to $175,000 (Bruno had wanted the threshold lowered to
$125,000).314 Second, he backed away from his previous insistence
on removing existing protections for the surviving life partner of an
unmarried couple who had resided in a rent-regulated apartment
(allowing the survivor to continue to be able to "inherit" the apart-
ment in which he lived). 315 One Republican Senator, quoted on
condition of anonymity, said, "It will be the Governor negotiating
309. See James Dao, G.O.P. Waging Internal Battles on Rent Policy, N.Y. TIMES,
June 4, 1997, at Al [hereinafter Dao, Waging Internal Battles].
310. See James Dao, The Rent Battle: The Overview; G.O.P. Eases Stand in Rent-
Law Fight, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1997, at Al [hereinafter Dao, Rent-Law Fight].
311. Pataki Was Playing 'Smart Politics,' N.Y. POST, May 13, 1997, at 3 ("Republi-
can insiders were also convinced that Pataki's top political consultants ... spent the
past two weeks secretly polling New York City voters on the rent issue and on how
they viewed Pataki's involvement with them").
312. See David L. Lewis, Worried? City Will Lend You an Ear, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
June 12, 1997, at 4.
313. See Clifford J. Levy, The Rent Battle: The Tenants; City Workers Flooded With
Phone Calls, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1997, § 1, at 29.
314. See Dao, Rent-Law Fight, supra note 310.
315. See Sarah Metzgar, Bruno Now Wants to Include Gays Under Rent Control,
TIMES UNION (Albany), June 12, 1997, at B2.
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with [Speaker Silver] from now on. "316 Indeed, the one thing that
did not occur in this period was any legislative debate whatsoever.
Vacancy decontrol was the issue that was defying resolution.
Senator Bruno said that, 'Besides vacancy decontrol, we could set-
tle the rest of this in 20 minutes. ' 317 There was some talk of in-
creasing the amount that landlords would be able to charge when a
tenant vacated an apartment as an alternative to full decontrol.3
18
The Times suggested that full vacancy decontrol should apply to
apartments where the current tenants earned more than $60,000
per year.319 But time continued to pass, and no agreement was
reached. Finally, the June 15th deadline arrived. It came and
went. At midnight, rent regulation expired. But shortly thereafter,
in the early morning hours of June 16th, Governor Pataki, Senator
Bruno, and Speaker Silver announced that a tentative agreement
had been reached.32 °
II. RESULTS OF THE DEBATE
A. The Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1997
It actually took several days before the tentative agreement was
translated into legislative language that was agreeable to all par-
ties, and, in that time, there were continued attempts to shape the
result. On June 19th, the end product emerged: Chapter 116 of the
Laws of 1997, known as the "Rent Regulation Reform Act of
1997. "321
Governor Pataki, Senator Bruno, and their anti-regulation allies
did not get their way insofar as vacancy decontrol did not make it
into the final bill. In lieu of vacancy decontrol, however, there
were several provisions designed to limit rent regulation or, as
Governor Pataki put it in his memorandum approving the bill, the
bill was expected to "restore market forces" and, over the course
of six years, "bring the rent levels of three out of every four stabi-
lized apartments to market levels. '322 Landlords won a guarantee
of a minimum increase of twenty percent each time an apartment
316. See Dao, Waging Internal Battles, supra note 309.
317. Gregg Birnbaum, D-Day For Rent Regs, N.Y. POST, June 15, 1997, at 13.
318. See James Dao, Vacancy Issue Becomes Focus of Rent Debate, N.Y. TIMES,
June 10, 1997, at Al.
319. See Editorial, End the Stalemate on Rent Laws, supra note 105.
320. See James Dao, The Rent Battle: The Overview; Tentative Agreement Reached
to Preserve Rent Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1997, at Al.
321. See Rent Regulation Reform Act, L. 1997 ("1997 RRRA"), ch. 116, § 1.
322. Governor's Bill Jacket, 1997 N.Y. LAws ch. 116.
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was vacated (the "special vacancy" allowance).323 In addition,
landlords were given the right to increase the rent further if an
apartment became vacant which had been occupied by the same
tenant for at least eight years.324 In those cases, the vacancy "bo-
nus" would be an increase of 0.6 percent for each year that the
apartment had been occupied.325 Additionally, these increases
were to be granted:
[I]n addition to any other increases authorized pursuant to [the
Rent Stabilization Law] including an adjustment based upon a
major capital improvement, or a substantial modification or in-
crease of dwelling space or services, or installation of new equip-
ment or improvements or new furniture or furnishings provided
in or to the housing accommodation pursuant to this section.326
Finally, notwithstanding talk about the importance of affordable
housing, the Act threw in an extra $100 per month increase for any
vacated apartment that had been renting for less than $300 per
month.327
The nature of the potential windfall for landlords is illustrated in
the scenario set forth in Table 1, which deals with a recently va-
cated apartment occupied by the same tenant for 15 years at $800
per month. Taking into account a modest investment by the land-
lord in improvements to the apartment ($10,000), and of the scena-
rio where, after four years, the new tenant moves on, the landlord
will be able to achieve in only four years a doubling of the rent to
$1,600. Thus, an apartment that had been affordable to a family
with a household income of $38,293 (the median in New York City
according to 2000 Census data)328 would have the potential of be-
coming in four years only affordable to a family with a household
income in excess of $75,000.329
In addition to permitting major changes in rent, the Act pro-
vided several ways of removing apartments from regulation alto-
gether.33 ° One mechanism was to reduce the annual household
income threshold for high rent, high income deregulation from
323. See 1997 RRRA §§ 19-20 (amending RSL § 26-511(c)(5)(a) (1969)). The
formula for a one-year renewal is slightly different.
324. See id.
325. See id.
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 SUMMARY FILE 3 (2000).
329. Calculations on affordability are based on the formula of allocating approxi-
mately 25 percent of gross monthly income to rent.
330. See 1997 RRRA §§ 19-20.
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TABLE 1. VACATING TENANT WHO HAD BEEN IN OCCUPANCY
FOR 15 YEARS, $800 RENTAL
Rent paid by vacating tenant 800.00
Special vacancy allowance for new two-year lease (20%) + 160.00
Vacancy bonus (0.6% x 15 = 9%) + 72.00
Landlord makes $10,000 in improvements to apartment + 250.00
(improvements x 1/40)
New rent for incoming tenant 1,282.00
After two years, tenant signs a 2-year renewal lease at a 4% increase + 51.28
Renewal rent for tenant in place 1,333.28
After another two years, tenant vacates, and landlord is allowed + 266.66
another 20% vacancy bonus
New rent after four years 1,599.94
$250,000 to $175,000.331 Another mechanism was to alter the
method of calculating "luxury" vacancy deregulation.332 This was
one of the "sticking points" over which negotiators had labored in
the aftermath of the tentative June 15th agreement.333 Prior to the
Act, this provision (which was introduced in the 1993 Rent Regula-
tion Reform Act) had applied to apartments renting for $2,000 or
more per month. The New York State Department of Housing and
Community Renewal ("DHCR") had interpreted this provision to
allow deregulation of apartments that had not been renting for
$2,000 per month or more, but would be if one were to calculate
the permitted increases. 334 The New York City Council had over-
ridden this interpretation, and had amended the Rent Stabilization
Law to provide that deregulation would only apply "if the vacating
tenant actually paid a legal rent of $2,000 or more. 335
The Act restored the interpretation originally put forth by
DHCR under Governor Pataki, and thus permitted decontrol of
apartments that would legally rent for $2,000 or more if permissible
vacancy increases were taken into account.336 As implemented by
331. 1997 RRRA §§ 14, 16, 17-b (amending RSL §§ 26-504.1; 26-504.3(b); 26-
504.3(c)(1); 26-504.3(c)(2)).
332. See Richard P6rez-Pefia, The Rent Battle: The Overview; After Handshake
Deal, Albany Bogs Down in Writing a Rent Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1997, at B4.
333. See id.
334. See WARREN A. ESTIS & JEFFREY TURKEL, THE NEW YORK REr REGULA-
TION REFORM Acr OF 1997: ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY 12 (1997).
335. See id.
336. 1997 RRRA § 15 (amending RSL § 26-504.2); see Governor's Bill Jacket, 1997
N.Y. LAWS ch.116. The intent was to repeal the City Council's amendment to the Rent
Stabilization Law and require "the deregulation of a vacant apartment any time its
maximum rent reached $2,000, regardless of the rent level at the time of vacancy" See
id.
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the Rent Stabilization Code, an apartment would qualify for
deregulation:
[W]here an owner installs new equipment or makes improve-
ments to their individual housing accommodation qualifying for
a rent increase. . .while such housing accommodation is vacant,
and where the legal regulated rent is raised on the basis of such
rent increase, or as a result of any rent increase permitted upon
vacancy or succession ... or by a combination of rent increases,
as applicable, to a level of $2,000 per month or more, whether or
not the next tenant in occupancy actually is charged or pays
$2,000 per month.337
The practical impact was two-fold, and is illustrated by Table 2,
below. This scenario is the same as that described previously (and
illustrated by Table 1, above), except that the rent which had been
paid by the vacating tenant in this example is $1,200, and the
amount of improvements made (or claimed to be made) by the
landlord is $18,500. Because the rent level could legally be over
$2,000 per month, the apartment is deregulated and the landlord is
free to charge whatever it wishes.
TABLE 2. VACATING TENANT WHO HAD BEEN IN OCCUPANCY
FOR 15 YEARS, $1,200 RENTAL
Rent paid by vacating tenant 1,200.00
Special vacancy allowance for new two-year lease (20%) 240.00
Vacancy bonus (0.6% x 15 = 9%) 108.00
Landlord makes $18,000 in improvements to apartment (improvements 462.50
x 1/40)
Legal rent for incoming tenant 2,010.50
This provision does not only help those landlords where "market
forces" would permit them to charge in excess of $2,000 per month.
Because the apartment is deregulated regardless of what the in-
coming tenant actually pays, the landlord, in effect, is able to
purchase her way, by spending on renovations, permanently out of
regulation. Thus, an incoming tenant, even if paying the same rent
as the outgoing tenant, would have no security of tenure, no right
to a particular term of lease, no right to a renewal lease, and none
of the other rights provided pursuant to the Rent Stabilization
Law.
To blunt criticism that the desire for vacancies would lead land-
lords to harass existing tenants until they left, the Act did effect
337. Rent Stabilization Code, N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2520.11(r)(8)
(i) (1997).
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modest changes in anti-harassment law. The maximum civil penalty
that could be imposed for such harassment was increased from
$1,000 to $5,000, and a minimum penalty of $1,000 was newly im-
posed.338 A criminal provision was added as well.339 The criminal
provision, however, only applied where the landlord, intending to
cause a tenant to vacate, intends to cause or recklessly causes phys-
ical injury to that tenant.341 The provision takes what would ordi-
narily be assault in the third degree, a crime based on the causing
of any physical injury, which is a Class A misdemeanor, and con-
verts it to a Class E felony (the lowest level of felony under New
York law).3 41 The former carries a maximum sentence of one year
of imprisonment; the latter carries a maximum sentence of four
years of imprisonment.342 The criminal provision did not address
in any way various forms of harassment (e.g., verbal abuse, denial
of services, etc.) that do not involve physical injury.3 43
With the exception of these harassment provisions, all of the re-
maining major provisions of the Act tended to enhance the power
of landlords in relation to that of tenants. One such important pro-
vision concerned the period for which tenants could be reimbursed
for rent overcharges, and, crucially, the manner in which the over-
charge was calculated. Prior to the Act, Court rulings had estab-
lished that, although tenants could collect an award for
overcharges for a period beginning on the date of the rent registra-
tion in place four years prior to a complaint (four to five years), the
calculation of the proper rent would go back to the earliest date on
which a proper "base rent" could be calculated (which could be 10
or 15 years, or even longer).344 Thus, a landlord who had been
overcharging for a long time would "get away with" all but the last
four years or so of overcharge, but would not get the benefit of
those overcharges in calculating what the proper rent should be.
The result is illustrated in Table 3, below.
338. See 1997 RRRA § 28-b (amending RSL § 26-516(c)(2)).
339. See PENAL LAW § 241.05(1999).
340. See 1997 RRRA § 28; see also PENAL LAW §§ 241.00, 241.05 (1999).
341. Compare PENAL LAW § 120.00 (1999), with PENAL LAW § 241.05 (1999).
342. Compare PENAL LAW § 70.15(1) (1999), with PENAL LAW § 70.00(2)(e) (1999).
343. See 1997 RRRA § 28; see also PENAL LAW § 241.00, § 241.05 (1999).
344. See ESTIS & TURKEL, supra note 334, at 16-17.
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TABLE 3. LANDLORD OVERCHARGES OVER A 10-YEAR PERIOD-
PRIOR TO THE ACT
Up to 10 years prior to complaint $200 per month
Up to 8 years prior to complaint $250 per month
Up to 6 years prior to complaint $300 per month
Up to 4 years prior to complaint $400 per month
Up to 2 years prior to complaint $500 per month
This landlord would have overcharged by a total of $39,600. While
the landlord would only be liable for an overcharge award in con-
nection with the last four years of overcharges (i.e., $21,600), the
rent would be rolled back the full $500 per month overcharge.
The Act put into effect a provision that allowed landlords to re-
tain more of their ill-gotten gains. In addition to pegging the start
date for rent overcharge liability at four years instead of the four-
to-five year period in effect previously, the Act explicitly precluded
examination of the rental history of a housing accommodation
prior to the four-year period preceding the filing of a complaint,
precluded a determination of an overcharge based on overcharging
that occurred more than four years prior, and precluded calculating
an award to the tenant based on overcharges that occurred more
than four years prior.34 5 The very different result is illustrated in
Table 4 below.
TABLE 4. LANDLORD OVERCHARGES OVER A 10-YEAR PERIOD,
SUBSEQUENT TO THE ACT
Up to 10 years prior to complaint $200 per month, but not considered an overcharge
Up to 8 years prior to complaint $250 per month, but not considered an overcharge
Up to 6 years prior to complaint $300 per month, but not considered an overcharge
Up to 4 years prior to complaint $400 per month, but treated as $100 per month
Up to 2 years prior to complaint $500 per month, but treated as $200 per month
This landlord, too, would have overcharged by $39,600. In this
case, however, the landlord doesn't merely "get away with" six
years of overcharges; the Act ratified all overcharges prior to the
four-year period before a complaint. The landlord is liable for only
$7,200 in overcharges, and the rent is rolled back only $200 per
month.
The system created under the Act has the potential for its biggest
abuse where there is a large gap between market rents and regu-
lated rents. In a neighborhood where it is not uncommon to be
paying $1,500 or $1,600 per month, a landlord could charge that
345. See 1997 RRRA § 33 (amending RSL § 26-516(a) (1969)).
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amount, and hope that a new tenant fails to discover that the previ-
ous long-term tenant had only been paying $600 or $800. So long
as the fraud is not discovered for four years, the illegal rent is rati-
fied, and the landlord, at the next vacancy, would easily be able to
remove the unit from regulation altogether under high rent, luxury
decontrol.
In another attempt to shift power from tenants to landlords, new
rules were imposed concerning the handling of rents claimed by
landlords during the pendency of litigation in Housing Court.
When tenants are sued by landlords, either for an alleged violation
of a lease provision, or for non-payment of rent, the tenant often
withholds rent. From the landlord's point of view, this creates the
risk that, even if she were ultimately to prevail, she might not be
able to collect the rent found to be due. From a tenant's point of
view, however, the only effective way in many circumstances to
complain about a lack of services is to withhold rent, and then,
when the landlord sues for non-payment, to interpose a counter-
claim for the landlord's failure to meet its statutory obligation to
maintain services and conditions (the "warranty of habitabil-
ity"). 346
The Act expanded the circumstances under which a tenant
would be required to deposit rent into court during the pendency
of litigation.347 Prior to the Act, tenants were already required to
deposit rent into court after the second adjournment they re-
quested.348 This requirement only applied to rent to come due in
the future, and the requirement could be waived for "good cause
shown." The requirement did not include adjournments that a ten-
ant needed to obtain counsel, and the requirement would not apply
where a building had "immediately hazardous violations of
record.
349
The Act abolished each and all of these restrictions.35 ° It also
provided that in the case of a building with twelve or fewer units,
the tenant must pay undisputed sums directly to the landlord dur-
ing the pendency of the litigation,35 1 a provision designed to meet
the perceived hardship suffered by small landlords, or at least land-
lords of small buildings.
346. See supra note 264.
347. See 1997 RRRA § 36 (amending ETPA § 745(2) (1974)).
348. See ESTIS & TURKEL, supra note 334, at 24.
349. See id. at 25.
350. See 1997 RRRA § 36.
351. See id.
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The Act also made relatively modest changes in the succession
rights of family members who were not named tenants. Nieces,
nephews, aunts, and uncles no longer automatically qualified as
"family members" entitled to succeed to the rights of a named ten-
ant.352 For family members who did step into the shoes of the orig-
inal named tenant, any members after the first would be treated as
a new tenant, with the various vacancy and other increases applica-
ble to such family members.353
Prior to the Act, landlords who failed to pay the requisite regis-
tration fee to the City for each rent stabilized apartment could not,
as a penalty, seek or collect rent increases.354 The threat of these
sanctions was a powerful incentive to comply with registration re-
quirements. The Act removed this incentive, and placed the bur-
den on the City to go out and try to collect unpaid fees.355
Even though new construction was not subject to rent regulation
unless the developer took advantage of a tax abatement or other
public benefit, the Act sought to respond to the perceived "double-
cross" issue of the possibility that someday new construction might
be subjected to regulation. The Public Housing Law was amended
to provide for contracts in which a developer would commit to
build and the State, in turn, would agree not to impose rent regula-
tion on the new construction for fifty years.356
In what was described in The Times as "the best illustration of
the power landlords' lobbyists held over the law's tiniest details,"
power exercised "for the benefit of only a few developers," the Act
made it easier for landlords to demolish rent-controlled buildings
that were already largely vacant but still had a few tenants in occu-
pancy.357 Under the provision inserted at the last moment, an
owner of a building with three or fewer tenants constituting ten
percent or less of the apartments in the building could get an order
requiring the tenants to leave, regardless of how long they had
lived in the apartment (in some circumstances the landlord would
be responsible for relocation costs).358 The president of the Real
352. See 1997 RRRA § 21 (amending PUB. Hous. LAW § 14(4)).
353. See 1997 RRRA § 22 (amending RSL § 26-512(f) (1969)).
354. RSL § 26-517.1 (in effect prior to June 19, 1997).
355. See 1997 RRRA § 30 (corresponds to RSL § 26-517.1, as amended).
356. See 1997 RRRA § 27 (amending PUB. Hous. LAW § 14(1)(w)).
357. See Randy Kennedy, In Final Deal, the Hidden Power of a Paragraph, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 1997, § 1, at 28 [hereinafter Kennedy, In Final Deal].
358. See 1997 RRRA § 38 (amending Rent & Rehabilitation Law, N.Y. CITy AD-
MIN. CODE § 26-408(b) (1969)). Note that this provision only applied to the smaller
number of rent controlled tenants who, on this issue, had previously enjoyed greater
protection than had rent stabilized tenants. See id.
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Estate Board of New York, which represents New York City's larg-
est developers, acknowledged that only five "significant members"
of the Board had "cared deeply" about the issue. 9 They got their
way.
Finally, rent regulation remained a temporary measure, as it had
always been. The Act was scheduled by its terms to expire in six
years,36 ° making the period leading up to June 15, 2003 the next
battleground between pro- and anti-regulation forces.
B. Winners and Losers
Notwithstanding the provisions of the Act described above, the
virtually unanimous contemporaneous judgment was that the bat-
tle had been won by the tenants, and that landlords got very little
at all. The news analysis in The Times stated that the "consensus
here [in Albany] is that the big winner was [State Assembly
Speaker] Silver, who stubbornly fought any significant change in
the laws, and the tenant organizers. '361 A follow-up article de-
scribed the result as "a retreat by Mr. Bruno and Mr. Pataki, fol-
lowed by legislation that largely keeps rent protections in place for
six more years. "362 The Times summed up its editorial view with
the headline, "A Molehill of Rent Reform. 36 3
This was indeed the consensus. "The governor merely provided
modest relief to landlords," wrote Crain 'S.364 The deal was "little
more than a half-step toward progress," wrote the Albany Times
Union.365 The Post wrote that the "[1]ast-minute pact is big victory
for Silver. '366 The president of the landlords' Rent Stabilization
Association complained that the agreement "was far from what is
needed for the health of the city's rental housing market. ' 367 And
a Republican State Senator from Rockland County, a suburb of
359. See Kennedy, In Final Deal, supra note 357.
360. 1997 RRRA § 17.
361. See James Dao, The Deal; As Usual, Down to the Wire in Albany, N.Y. TIMES,
June 17, 1997, at Al.
362. See Dao & Pdrez-Pefia, supra note 38.
363. Editorial, A Molehill of Rent Reform, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1997, at A20.
364. Editorial, Viewpoint: Will Pataki Add Insult to Injury?, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus.,
June 23, 1997, at 8.
365. See Marc Humbert, Lose-lose on Rent Laws, TIMES UNION (Albany), June 18,
1997, at A10.
366. Gregg Birnbaum et al., Rent Protection is Saved at the Bell: Last-minute Pact Is
Big Victory for Silver, N.Y. POST, June 16, 1997, at 2.
367. See Mark Humbert, Senate, Assembly Approve Rent Bill, TIMES UNION (Al-
bany), June 20, 1997, at Al.
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New York City, joined the chorus, voicing his view that, "We got
beat up ... and didn't accomplish anything. 368
The consensus certainly captured the critical fact that Governor
Pataki and his anti-regulation allies had not succeeded in putting
rent regulation on a certain path to destruction, as they had wished
to do. In this vein, pro-regulation State Senator Catherine Abate,
in the course of the thirty minute "debate" during which the State
Senate to rubber-stamped the Pataki-Bruno-Silver agreement, said
she thought "we averted disaster. '369 The consensus ignored, how-
ever, the significant progress anti-regulation forces had made on a
number of fronts. As one tenant advocate put it: "We've got a situ-
ation where they've chipped away a lot .... There will be less rent-
regulated tenants next time around to fight back .... And they will
be back in six years to take away the rest.
370
On issue after issue, the Act represented a distinct shift in power
from tenants to landlords. Even leaving aside the material gains
landlords would begin to realize each time an apartment was va-
cated, they and their allies achieved a mechanism to push more
apartments towards the deregulation point and more tenants out of
the universe of those who are protected. Crain's wrote in May 1997
that a key benefit of vacancy decontrol was that it would "help
undermine the political support for rent regulations. ' 371 While not
achieving vacancy decontrol, the Act fueled the process of chipping
away at rent regulation's direct constituency. Moreover, Governor
Pataki and other anti-regulation advocates appear to have had a
real impact on public opinion. The only hopeful note struck in
Crain's debate post-mortem, in fact, was related to the battle for
public opinion: "There are signs that New Yorkers can be mobil-
ized to support change. "372 Specifically, the Times poll cited by
Crain's showed forty-eight percent of New Yorkers supporting va-
cancy decontrol; the Daily News poll cited by Crain's showed that
poll respondents, on average, thought that those earning more than
368. See Michael Finnegan & Joel Siegel, Pols Fear the Wrath of Voters, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, June 17, 1997, at 6.
369. NEW YORK STATE SENATE DEBATE TRANSCRIPTS 5665 (Mar. 17, 1997) (state-
ment of Ms. Abate). The Senate debate transpired on June 19, 1997. See id. For the
length of the debate, see Humbert, supra note 367.
370. See Merle English, Tenants Groups Split Over Rent Deal, NEWSDAY, June 17,
1997, at A25.
371. See Editorial, Biz Support, supra note 190.
372. See Editorial, Media and Rent: The Untold Story, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., June 16,
1997, at 8.
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$78,000 per year should not have the protection of rent
regulation.373
Given the controversy that attended the debate, however, and
the fact that the same Times poll showed overwhelming support
(over seventy percent) for the continuation of rent regulation in
some form, 374 anti-regulation advocates could not have been alto-
gether confident that public debate would go their way when rent
regulation next came up for extension. Though little-remarked
upon, the decision reached by Governor Pataki and legislative
leaders to extend rent regulation by six years-not five, not
seven-was therefore of great political importance. Instead of hav-
ing to face the potential ire of voters who support rent-regulation
in a gubernatorial-election year (which would have resulted from a
one- or five-year extension), or in a state-legislative election year
(which would have resulted from an extension of one, three, five,
or seven years), or even in a Mayoral-election year (which would
have resulted from a four-year extension), they timed the next de-
bate for a year after a gubernatorial election, a year in which no
major electoral race was scheduled.
C. Aftermath: The 2003 Consolidation of the Gains of
Anti-Regulation Forces
In the spring of 2003, New York State was convulsed in a battle
over its budget. The Governor and Legislature, having not put
New York's fiscal house in order the previous year (an election
year), now had to face a series of unappetizing choices. The Gov-
ernor, seeking to maintain his anti-tax credentials, was unwilling to
sign on to any proposed increases in revenue. In a rare display of
cooperation, the Republican Senate and the Democratic Assembly
ultimately joined together to increase taxes over the Governor's
veto.
Meanwhile, rent regulation waited on the sidelines. Tenant ad-
vocates, who wanted to end, or at least raise the threshold for,
high-rent vacancy decontrol, were not able to muster much pres-
sure or attention. The Governor, after all, had assured the public
that he wanted to have the existing system maintained with only
minor modifications.375 Senator Bruno had called for a lowering of
373. See Michael Finnegan, N.Y.ers: Lower Lid on Income; 2 Out of 3 Favor Cut,
Poll Sez, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 5, 1997, at 4; Firestone, supra note 1.
374. See Firestone, supra note 1.
375. See Stephanie Gaskell, Surprise! Bruno Backs Tenants In Rent Battle, N.Y.
POST, June 4, 2003, at 2.
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the threshold of high rent vacancy decontrol, but it was believed he
was only seeking to counterbalance the pro-tenant demands of As-
sembly Speaker Silver.376 Only as June 15th (expiration day) ap-
proached was there any sense of tension. As though to prove that
the State Government was constitutionally incapable of acting in a
timely fashion, the players did not reach agreement by June 15th.
Instead, as the public waited, they passed a one-day "extender" of
rent regulation.377 Ultimately, they did this four times.378
On June 20th, Senator Bruno, with the support of the Governor,
executed what was universally described as a surprise: he had the
Senate pass an eight-year extension of rent regulation with only mi-
nor modifications.379 Immediately after passing the bill, the Senate
adjourned for the summer. The Assembly, knowing that inaction
on the Senate bill would let the rent laws lapse, reluctantly fol-
lowed suit with passage of its own.38 ° Assembly Democrats did not
want "to gamble that the Senate would eventually come back for
more negotiations, so they called it quits in what amounted to a
weighty game of political chicken. ' ' 381 The Governor immediately
signed the bill into law.382
On its face, the 2003 Act did not seem to effect radical change.
The law affirmed a regulation that allowed for decontrol based on
a maximum permissible rent in excess of $2,000 a month (even if a
landlord had never actually rented for that sum), making it clear
that a landlord who charged a tenant less than the maximum would
be able to revert to the maximum when market conditions permit-
ted 383 and strengthened the already strong prohibitions on New
York City enacting stricter rent regulation measures than the State
had in place.384 In substance, however, the centerpiece of the 2003
Act was apparent continuity: the eight-year extension.385
376. See Juan Gonzalez, Tenants Betting the Rent on Queens Pol, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, June 12, 2003, at 37.
377. 2003 N.Y. LAWS ch. 70.
378. 2003 N.Y. LAWS chs. 70-73.
379. See S. 5693, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003), 2003 N.Y. LAWS ch. 82, available
at http://www.housingnyc.com/resources/renewal20O3.html [hereinafter 2003 Act];
Winnie Hu with David W. Chen, Endgame in Albany: Rents Laws; Albany Extends
Landlord Power Over Rent Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2003, at Al.
380. See Hu with Chen, supra note 379.
381. See id.
382. See id.
383. See 2003 Act § 3.
384. See 2003 Act §§ 1 to 6-a.
385. See 2003 Act § 17.
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Unlike 1997, no one described the 2003 Act as a victory for te-
nants, an easy conclusion when even the head of the Rent Stabili-
zation Association was saying that, "We are glad that in fact the
status quo has been maintained. '3 6 The reason was clear. The
longer the system that had been imposed in 1997 stayed in place,
the more apartments would be deregulated as they priced out of
the system. The process of deregulation has already begun. Ac-
cording to a tenant advocacy group, from 1991 to 2002, 148,000
occupied apartments were culled from the overall stock of rent-
regulated apartments; 64,000 of these apartments were estimated
to have been lost through conversion to co-op status, while 84,000
were estimated to be lost to high-rent vacancy decontrol.38 7 A re-
port by the City's Rent Guidelines Board placed the number of
apartments lost to high-rent vacancy decontrol in the shorter pe-
riod from 1994 to 2002 at 24,370, but cautioned that this number
was understated due to underreporting.388 If one instead extrapo-
lated from what the Board considered more reliable 2001 and 2002
figures, then the figure for the full period of 1994 to 2002 would be
50,067. 389
The numbers produced by Census Bureau's Housing and Va-
cancy Survey were also telling. The percentage of renter occupied
housing renting for more than $1,000 in gross rent390 rose from 15.9
percent in 1996 to 27.3 percent in 2002, an increase of more than 70
percent in terms of the share of all units represented in this price
386. See Hu with Chen, supra note 379.
387. TENANTS & NEIGHBORS, Rent Regulation: New York's Largest and Most Ef-
fective Affordable Housing Program (Feb. 2002), at http://www.tandn.org/issuebrie
fs.cfm?contentid=31 (last visited Oct. 21, 2003); see Shaila K. Dewan, Deregulation By
Landlords is Increasing, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2002, § 1, at 37. The Times
report noted that a landlord representative asserted that the report was "self-serving"
and designed only to "scare people and make politicians think that there is a crisis out
there." See id.
388. N.Y. CITY REr GUIDELINES BD., CHANGES TO THE RENT STABILIZED Hous-
ING STOCK IN NEW YORK CITY, 1994-2002 6 (2003), available at http://www.hous-
ingnyc.com/research/pdf-reports/changes94-02.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2003).
389. For the figures used in this arithmetic, see id.
390. Gross rent is a calculation that includes the cost of utilities whether paid di-
rectly to utility companies or through a landlord. See MooN WHA LEE, N.Y. Cim'
DEP'T OF Hous. PRESERVATION & DEV., SELECTED FINDINGS OF THE 2002 NEW
YORK CITY HOUSING AND VACANCY SURVEY 5 (2003), available at http://home.nyc.
gov/html/hpd/pdf/hvs-initial-findings-2002.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2003).
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category. 391 The raw number of units renting for $1,500 or more
increased by 58.2 percent.392
It is evident that more units will continue to come out of regula-
tion. The 2002 Housing and Vacancy Survey showed that there
were 226,840 stabilized apartments that rented for $1,000 or
more.393 By a process of annual rent renewal increases, vacancy
allowances, and capital improvement allowances, many of those
apartments are either now or will within the next eight years be at
or nearing the $2,000 threshold cutoff for high-rent vacancy decon-
trol (if not lost to the rental market by conversion to cooperative
or condominium ownership).
By imposing the eight-year extension, anti-regulation forces
were able to achieve a static decontrol ceiling of $2,000 for a period
totaling fourteen years (1997-2011). In that time, of course, the
value of 1997 dollars does not remain constant. Even if one were
to use the Consumer Price Index and projections of that Index
from the Office of Management and Budget and/or the Congres-
sional Budget Office-conservative estimates because of the
under-weighting of housing costs-it turns out that $2,000 in 2011
is projected to be the equivalent of less than $1,500 in 1997 dol-
lars. 394 In essence, therefore, anti-regulation advocates have re-
duced the threshold of "high rent" vacancy decontrol by at least 25
percent without having to take the politically more provocative
391. Compare id. at 21 tbl.13, with N.Y CITY DEP'T OF Hous. PRESERVATION &
DEV., SELECTED FINDINGS OF THE 1999 NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AND VACANCY
SURVEY 16 tbl.1l (1999), at http://home.nyc.gov/htmlfhpd/pdf/hvs-initial-findings-
1999.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2003).
392. See LEE, supra note 390, at 2. The Census Bureau urges caution in comparing
2002 data with earlier data because the 2002 samples were based on 2000 census infor-
mation, whereas the previous samples were based on 1990 census information. See
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AND VACANCY SURVEY, at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/nychvs/2002/statement.html (last visited
Nov. 17, 2003).
393. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AND VACANCY
SURVEY, RENTER OCCUPIED HOUSING UNITS BY RENT REGULATION STATUS, SE-
RIES IA-TABLE 35, at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/nychvs/2002/slat35.
html (last visited Nov. 17, 2003).
394. These inflation numbers rely on analysis devised by Professor Robert Sahr of
Oregon State University, who took his data from the Consumer Price Index through
2002. See ROBERT SAHR, INFLATION CONVERSION FACTORS FOR DOLLARS 1665 TO
ESTIMATED 2013, at http://oregonstate.edu/dept/pol-sci/fac/sahr/sahr.htm#_Down
load ConversionFactors_1 (last visited Oct. 24, 2003). Sahr's estimates for the years
2003 to 2008 are averaged from the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") and
Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") estimates; thereafter, his estimates are based
on CBO estimates only. See id. In no case does an projected annual inflation rate
exceed 2.5 percent. See id.
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step of actually changing the dollar figure that people associate
with the threshold.395 In short, Republicans in Albany achieved
what a post-passage analysis in The Times suggested was their goal
all along: "to erode what they say is a system of government price-
fixing that has outlived its usefulness. 396
CONCLUSION
Writing in 2000, Thomas Frank observed that: "Once Americans
imagined that economic democracy meant a reasonable standard of
living for all-that freedom was only meaningful once poverty and
powerlessness had been overcome. Today, however, American
opinion leaders seem generally convinced that democracy and the
free market are simply identical."3 97 This had been an old song
from business; the difference was, he wrote, "this idea's triumph
over all its rivals; the determination of American leaders to extend
it to all the world; the general belief among opinion-makers that
there is something natural, something divine, something inherently
democratic about markets. 398
By 2003, many market-based chickens had come home to roost,
and with new business scandals emerging almost every day, the po-
litical landscape seemed, at least temporarily, to be in many ways
changed from what it had been in the 1990s. Market theologians,
while not in full retreat, were not in a position any longer to engage
in what Frank called their "good cop/bad cop" routine ("The mar-
ket will give you a voice, empower you to do whatever you want to
do-and if you have any doubts about that, then the market will
crush you and everything you've ever known").39 9
In the course of the 1997 debate on rent regulation, however, the
market theologians were in full battle cry. Since rent regulation
had to go, the only question was how best to put it out of its misery.
Basic to this effort was the characterization of free markets as nat-
ural and inevitable.400 The chief Albany Times Union reporter, to
395. In stark contrast to the inflation estimates, the renewal lease increases that
were approved by the Rent Guidelines Board for the year beginning Oct. 1, 2003,
were 4.5 percent for a one-year renewal and 7.5 percent for a two-year renewal. See
N.Y. CITY RENT GUIDELINES BD., 2003 APARTMENT & LOFT ORDER #35 (2003),
available at http://housingnyc.com/Guidelines/orders/order35.html.
396. See Hu with Chen, supra note 379.
397. THOMAS FRANK, ONE MARKET UNDER GOD: EXTREME CAPITALISM, MAR-
KET POPULISM, AND THE END OF ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 15 (2000).
398. Id.
399. Id. at 344.
400. See TUCKER, supra note 59, at 14 (stating that elimination of rent control is
desiged to return housing to the symmetry of the free market).
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take but one example, was so enraptured by this technique that she
repeated her catechism in article after article: she always described
the rent laws as having "artificially" reduced rents.40 1
The anti-regulation effort required the pretense that deregula-
tion was calculated not to line the pockets of landlords, but to help
people find housing, especially affordable housing. It required the
assurance that everything would be better for tenants once market
competition was restored-reasonable rents, more apartments. It
required people to believe that vacancy decontrol was a compro-
mise proposal, and would not actually end rent regulation as it was
intended to do. It required people to believe that existing law con-
strained new construction more than it did. It required that the
issue of security of tenure for tenants be ignored as best as possi-
ble. In short, it required that all values other than market values
be suppressed.
But, though anti-regulation advocates tried hard, and although
they spoke as though the nirvana they promised was "a nailed-shut
scientific certainty," they could not yet achieve all they wanted.
Their arguments, as columnist Jim Dwyer put it in the Daily News,
were "actually a matter of faith."4 He might have said their argu-
ments were a matter of "smoke-and-mirrors." During the debate,
just as Governor Pataki did not want to discuss vacancy decontrol,
he "avoided discussing whether he had any incentives to boost
housing construction by saying efforts should first be devoted to
resolving the rent-regulation battle. '40 3 In the end, for all the talk
of wanting to deregulate to achieve more affordable housing, the
law actually passed had no provision for creating affordable hous-
ing. For all the talk of market competitiveness, it turns out that
examining the idea of such competitiveness is very different from
assuming the truth of the idea. It turns out that the idea, as applied
to the New York housing market, is illusory.
Some might say that the debate could have proceeded differ-
ently. It could have proceeded with the recognition that certain
crucial areas at the intersection of economic activity and public in-
terest have traditionally been regulated. As Frank Padavan, the
rare Republican State Senator who favored rent regulation said,
401. See, e.g., Sarah Metzgar, Clock ticking on talks to end rent-law impasse, TIMES
UNION (Albany), June 15, 1997, at Al; Sarah Metzgar, Weighing the Price of Rent
Deal, TIMES UNION (Albany), June 17, 1997, at Al.
402. Jim Dwyer, Wanted: Tenants Who Pay For What They Get, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
June 12, 1997, at 4.
403. See Yan, supra note 176.
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"When you say 'control,' that smacks of Big Brother. But we have
regulated utility rates.., insurance companies, hospitals. The con-
cept of the state regulating certain aspects of life is not limited to
this issue."4 °4 The debate could have proceeded with an examina-
tion of a variety of methods other than deregulation designed to
create more housing: restoring government funding, making it
more difficult to convert rental apartments to cooperative units,
permitting residential development in areas previously zoned to be
commercial or industrial, redirecting the advantages that have long
accrued to those who flee the city for the suburbs, and to those
who purchase over those who rent. It could have recognized the
analogous context of regulation of minimum wages where,
"[c]ontrary to predictions based on competitive models or the la-
bor market, recent increases in state minimum wages have not had
a discernable impact on employment."4 5 It could even have recog-
nized that for all the talk of the glorious early twentieth century
days of the free market having created massive amounts of new
housing on its own, New York's housing actually relied on and fol-
lowed the expansion of the subways and the elevated trains,
projects undertaken at a public cost of $1.478 billion (a cost during
a time "when $1 billion really meant something").4 °6
But the ideological stakes in the debate over rent regulation
have always been high. Richard Arnott, writing in 1995 about why
a disproportionately high percentage of journal articles on empiri-
cal housing analysis take rent regulation as their subject, suggested
that, "The debate over rent control has been a battleground be-
tween those who believe in the free market and those who do not.
The echoes of the debate carry over to other policy arenas where
its resolution has far more quantitative import. ' 40 7 There was no
reason to expect the 1997 debate to be any different.
And, in reality, it was especially difficult to imagine that a more
truthful and enlightened debate could actually have been con-
ducted in the political circumstances that obtained in 1997. Land-
lords had not suddenly become more altruistic; their allies had not
suddenly become more honorable. Rent regulation remained a
symbolic battleground for those who sought deregulation of every-
thing, everywhere. What anti-regulation advocates saw was a
404. See Katti Gray, Padavan's Stance on Rent Typically Independent, NEWSDAY,
June 30, 1997, at A21.
405. Arnott, supra note 249, at 117.
406. See Dwyer, supra note 210.
407. Arnott, supra note 249, at 117.
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golden opportunity to apply at the local level, a trend toward der-
egulation that had been enriching the few and hobbling the social
protections provided by the state for many years. Their lust for
greater profits and greater power in relation to tenants was not
new, nor was their knowledge that their underlying aims were un-
popular. What they had was a Governor, a State Senate, and a
unanimous editorial class, all of whom thought nothing of making
sacrifice at the altar of the market, regardless of consequences. It
was a chance they couldn't afford to miss.
In the course of the debate, William Eimicke, a former State
Housing Commissioner and an observer who had expressed reser-
vations about the rent regulation system, was asked about criticism
that the conduct of the State Legislature in respect to rent regula-
tion "has been guided largely by one equation: Tenants outnumber
landlords. ' 408 His response was telling: "If you're arguing that it's
because the people want it, excuse me. This is a democracy."40 9 A
democracy ought to be a place in which people choose among com-
peting policy prescriptions, and are not be subjected to theological
discourses about the wisdom and inevitability of the market, dis-
courses that insist that talk of alternatives is either quixotic or sub-
versive. A democracy ought to be a place in which no participant
in a policy debate-let alone the Governor-knowingly and relent-
lessly attempts to deceive and mislead the people as to the purpose
and consequences of the policy choice being proposed.
In this light, therefore, the anti-regulation campaign of 1997 was
thus fundamentally anti-democratic. It was a campaign that, as
confirmed by the Legislature's action in 2003, has set rent regula-
tion on the path to elimination. It was a campaign that, as Crain's
observed at the time, had the utility of helping "undermine the po-
litical support for rent regulations. '410 Nevertheless, there were
still in 2003 close to one million rent stabilized housing units.411
Whether rent-regulated tenants will see the consequences of the
current system and seek to change it before their political clout
disappears is a question that remains to be answered.
408. Sam Roberts, The Rentocracy; The Case for Rent Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, May
4, 1997, § 6, at 43.
409. See id.
410. See Editorial, Biz Support, supra note 190.
411. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 393. The exact number, according to
the Census Bureau, is 988,393. See id.
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APPENDIX
CHRONOLOGY OF NEW YORK CITY RENT
REGULATION SYSTEM
4 12
1920 Rents laws preventing evictions and regulation rents are passed.
1921 United State Supreme Court upholds New York rent regula-
tions.
1929 New York City's rent laws expire and are not renewed by the
state legislature.
1942 President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs the Emergency Price Con-
trol Act, the enabling legislation establishing federal wartime
rent controls.
1943 Federal rent control is administratively imposed in New York
City.
1947 The Federal Housing and Rent Act of 1947 exempts apartments
built after February 1947 from national rent control.
1950 The New York State legislature passes the Emergency Housing
Act of 1950 that establishes the State Temporary Rent Commis-
sion to oversee New York State's rent control system.
1962 The Emergency Housing Act of 1962 gives New York City the
responsibility of administering its rent control system.
1969 Rent stabilization begins in New York City. Rents in buildings
built after 1947 and previously decontrolled units in buildings of
six or more units are brought under rent stabilization. The Rent
Guidelines Board, the Rent Stabilization Association, and the
Conciliation and Appeals Board (CAB) are established to
administer rent stabilization.
1970 New York City approves the Maximum Base Rent system, intro-
ducing the concept of economic rent to the city's rent-controlled
stock.
1971 The Vacancy Decontrol Law of 1971 is imposed by the state,
providing for the decontrol of all controlled and stabilized units
after a change in tenancy.
1974 The Emergency Tenant Protection Act terminates vacancy
decontrol for rent-stabilized apartments and requires that
vacated rent-controlled units in building of six or more units
come under rent stabilization after a free-market rent (subject to
tenant challenge as excessive) is negotiated with the new tenant.
1984 New York State once again assumes full responsibility for
administering New York City's rent regulation system. The
CAB is eliminated.
412. All material in this appendix through 1993 (except that in brackets) is taken
from Keating, supra note 191, at 153 tbl.11.1.
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1993 The Rent Regulation Reform Act extends the rent regulation
system through 1997 [and introduces high rent vacancy decontrol
and high rent, high income decontrol].
1997 Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1997 extends rent regulation,
but seeks to cut back on the number of regulated units.
2003 Legislature, with only minor modifications, extends the 1997
regime for another eight years.
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